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Abstract 
The objective is to understand to what extent the EU’s behaviors/reactions, especially the use 
of sanctions, against the third countries vary in accordance with strategic or normative 
motivations and secondarily how the EU’s foreign policy choices have been varied over time. 
For this purpose, the thesis explores the EU’s stated motivations and actual practices by 
employing content analysis. Additionally, both the EU’s use and non-use of sanctions are 
analyzed through case studies of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus from 2002 to 2013. The 
theoretical frameworks of neo-realism and social constructivism/normative theory are used to 
derive the hypotheses. The results show that the EU’s stated motivations pursue its normative 
considerations, yet the perception of threat by undertaking an intermediary role influences 
actual practices, accordingly motivations. When the perception of threat is high, the norms 
forming the basis of stated motivations give way to motivations such as stability and security. 
Moreover, it is seen the weaknesses of all case-countries in the field of human rights and 
democracy norms continue to be present over time. In response, the EU specifies its explicit 
demand from Belarus by defining the democratization criteria. For Ukraine and Russia the EU 
acts relatively strategically and narrows down its focus generally on the weaknesses of the 
norms that also concerns the investment climate. The EU’s scope of normative power seems 
to be influenced by its capability vis-à-vis third countries. 
Key words: European Union, foreign policy, sanctions/restrictive measures, strategic 
interests, normative power, norm promotion, economic interests, security interests, neo-
realism. 
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1. Introduction 
In the international arena, some governments continue violating democratic principles and 
human rights while there is an increasing emphasis on the respect for human rights in the 
foreign policies of western liberal states. The end of the Cold War represents victory for 
liberal democracy and appearance of new international order where the focus is directed to 
human rights and democracy which are also important for economic development. As a 
response to these developments, references to ensure democracy, rule of law and respect for 
human rights were included as objectives of the new Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) within the framework of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Bartels 2005: 1; King 
1999: 324). For protection and promotion of these principles and values universally, the EU 
supports other countries technically and financially, and in the case of violations, the Union 
uses its punishment mechanism in the form of ‘sanctions’ (Bartels 2005: 1).  
However, the promotion of human rights externally on occasion creates conflict with the self-
interests of the states. It becomes an issue, especially for a large state, since they have 
complex aims within foreign policy which most likely contradict the ambitious human rights 
policy (King 1999: 324). Thus, the understanding of EU foreign policy where interests of all 
member states come together becomes complicated. The studies on the EU have also treated it 
as explicitly ‘different’ type of international actor (Tocci 2008: 1). The EU’s foreign policy 
should be understood not only in accordance with the values and principles of the Union as 
set out in the official documents but also in line with its actual motivations and actions. This 
is because scholars analyzing the EU on the basis of principles and norms ‘neglect to study 
actual practices’ leading to grasp the whole reality in a limited way (Costall 2009, in Ruffa 
2011: 563), and because an analysis limited with normative approach will be ‘reductionist’ 
due to weaknesses of liberal-idealist approach (Hyde-Price 2006).  
There are different types of instruments for promoting respect for the EU’s principles and 
norms. As mentioned above, some available options are technical assistance, financial aid, 
diplomacy and imposition of sanctions. This study in general will focus on an EU foreign 
policy tool, the sanctions, and the situations in which the sanctions are used and not used. 
In academic debate, the EU has been mainly discussed as an actor having power to expand its 
own norms and values leading to the occurrence of the concept “normative power Europe” 
(Manners 2002); however, this role of the EU has been criticized by other researchers who 
have brought an explanation from a realist perspective and directed their focus on the 
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limitations on the EU’s normative power (Hyde-Price 2006; Sjursen 2006; Pace 2007). 
According to Hyde-Price (2006), as stated above, having a sense of the EU’s international 
role from liberal-idealist point of view is ‘reductionist’ because first, EU foreign and security 
policy is constrained with systemic factors such as structural distribution of power; second, 
liberal-idealist view underestimates the role of power; third, they accept an actor basing on 
normative principles as ‘good thing’ that prevents one to analyze the object of study critically. 
It is necessary to take both conceptualizations of the EU into account as there is possibility 
that normative and strategic considerations may have influence on decisions and processes to 
a certain degree. Then, finding out with what motivations the EU shapes its foreign policy, in 
particular its sanctions policy is useful to understand what role the EU have in world politics. 
It may be normative power acting in accordance with its norms and values while its strategic 
interests and power distribution in international arena may be other factors influencing the 
Union. In order to understand this, this study will attempt to find out motivations and trace 
actual practices of the EU through the analysis of the use and non-use of sanctions. Analysis 
of the Union’s use of sanctions will present whether EU core principles and values are 
predominantly attached to its identity, becoming a primary concern directing the EU’s 
actions. Understanding this will let one to comprehend the scope of the EU’s normative 
power. On the other hand, analysis of the EU’s non-use of sanctions will contribute in 
comprehending the extent of the influence of normative considerations and strategic interests 
on decision to use sanctions.  
1.1 Motivation, Aim and Research Questions 
This study starts with the fact that the EU uses the instrument of sanctions vis-à-vis the 
countries due to human rights violations and other reasons stated by the member states. By 
imposing sanctions, the EU demonstrates its commitment to human rights in its foreign policy 
since sanctions’ imposition has a cost to the sender. It becomes a way of promoting the norms 
and values in case of non-commitment to the principles by the target. However, violations 
have been frequently repeated in different parts of the world and as previous research 
(Brummer 2009) indicates the EU does not activate its sanctions instrument vis-à-vis all 
countries violating those norms. This study is stemming from this point. Paradigms explaining 
this situation will be uncovered deductively by getting the benefit of explanatory power of the 
existing theories. One purpose is to understand how the EU uses its sanctions policy and on 
what basis the target countries are chosen. As mentioned above, the EU is described with the 
concept of normative power due to its commitment to conduct its external relations on 
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normative basis, and its use of sanctions indicates the significance of these principles for the 
EU. The EU believes in that exportation of these principles will benefit all. With a normative 
understanding, this is the reason to impose sanctions against certain countries. On the other 
hand, non-use of sanctions may be related to the EU’s strategic interests, economic interests 
and its relative power and capabilities vis-à-vis the potential target country. Also the reasons 
for the imposition of sanctions may be related to security because a stable and secure 
environment is advantageous for the EU. 
The study will be on a foreign policy instrument of the EU, therefore it will be possible to 
understand the EU as an international actor. Moreover, this study will contribute in 
understanding to what extent the EU’s behaviors/reactions, especially the use of sanctions, 
against the third countries vary in accordance with strategic or normative motivations and 
secondarily how the EU’s foreign policy choices have been varied over time. For this 
purpose, the sub-objectives are: to find the stated motivations; to understand actual 
motivations by looking at the EU’s actual practices, actions, policies through three case-
countries; and to observe the extent of the stated and actual motivations’ conformity. This will 
be observed in order to provide empirical knowledge and to test the findings against existing 
theoretical predictions. The expected results of the thesis will display what kind of actor the 
EU is; which motivations the EU has for the use and non-use of sanctions; whether the 
interests of the EU affects the decision to impose sanctions on certain countries; whether the 
EU’s reactions vary over time according to consequences of the EU’s use of sanctions and 
actions/policies taken against the countries. At the end, this will let me evaluate the theoretical 
concepts describing the EU.  
Therefore, the following questions will be addressed in this study:  
1) To what extent are the EU’s use and non-use of sanctions vis-à-vis certain countries 
motivated in accordance with normative causes or strategic interests? 
2) What are the stated motivations of the EU in imposing sanctions?  
3) How has the EU’s foreign policy regarding the use of sanctions with normative motivations 
been varied over time? 
The variation over time is taken into account by considering that the focus on how EU 
motivations and actual practices vary depending on changing conditions will provide a 
prediction regarding the EU’s future practices and motivations. This is secondary objective of 
this study. 
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1.2 Disposition  
The thesis will first define sanction in a manner of how the term will be used in this study and 
provide a background for EU sanctions policy. In chapter 3, the use of sanctions in EU 
foreign policy and the approaches used by the previous researches are presented through a 
literature review in order to position the study in relation to previous studies and theories. The 
theories explained are also used in order to derive the hypotheses, and their operationalization 
is explained in detail. In chapter 4, the chosen methods and data are described within 
analytical approach, design, case selection and processing the data. The materials selected for 
answering the research questions are examined in the results and analysis section – chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions by summarizing the findings in relation to theoretical 
framework.  
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2. EU Sanctions Policy and Definition of Sanctions 
 
2.1 Definition of Sanctions 
There is “no authoritative legal source” involving universally agreed fixed definition of the 
term ‘sanctions’ (Partsch 1994; in Portela 2010: 20). In the literature, sanctions are defined in 
two ways as positive and negative, and they are generally examined with the terms ‘carrots 
and sticks’. The studies of Hazelzet (2001) and Drezner (1999) are some of them. Under 
international law, the term ‘sanctions’ is mostly comprehended as negative measures which 
may be in the form of cessation of flow of goods and services that are crucial for the target. 
Hence, measures inflicting more pain on the target are more under focus. This form of taking 
action is perceived more influential to change behavior. Positive sanctions are focused less as 
compared to negative sanctions. In definition, positive sanctions are “promise or actually 
deliver valuables to the targeted actor, in the hope of seeing changed behavior or as a reward 
for actually having changed behavior” (Wallensteen and Staibano 2005: 230). Yet in case of 
non-compliance to the preferred behavior of the sender, it may switch into negative sanctions. 
Negative sanctions are viewed as punishment of an already occurred action but there is also 
an “inbuilt reward” in it. It is the removal of sanctions in case of compliance. However, lifting 
of the sanctions does not turn the nature of sanctions from negative to positive (Ibid.).  
An action is defined as a sanction when sender performs it deliberately with an evident and 
explicit motive. Sender may deliberately cause a deprivation in the targeted actor due to 
violation of required principles or unacceptable behavior. It can be deprivation of resources, 
membership status, freezing of bilateral relations and so on. Such action is defined as negative 
sanctions. On the contrary, in case of the sender proposing to add something to the existing 
conditions of the target such as recognition, membership or economic assistance in return of 
satisfied conditions/behavior by the target, it becomes positive sanctions. In both of them, 
there is an expectation of the sender for the target’s compliance (Wallensteen and Staibano 
2005: 230ff). It is seen that sanctions are perceived and used in two different ways, but the 
focus in this study is on the negative sanctions.  
2.2 Background and Development of EU Sanctions Policy  
EU sanctions practice has been realized through a Council Regulation in 1982 when the EU 
restricted trade with the Soviet Union partially in order to protest against its involvement in 
the crackdown of the Solidarity movement in Poland. Following decades, the EU 
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implemented embargoes of the UN and OSCE in addition to other its own ‘autonomous’ 
sanctions which are not based on the Resolutions of the UN Security Council. Researchers 
mainly focusing on the UN activity called the 1990s as the “sanctions decade” and it is those 
times when the use of sanctions by the EU expanded. For instance, the EU responded to the 
conflicts occurred in the Balkans and the Caucasus by imposing sanctions (Johansson et.al. 
2010: 33-34). 
The use of sanctions autonomously improved coordination in the foreign policy field among 
member states, noticed by the transformation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Portela 2010: 20). Together with this 
evolution, the formulation way of decision on sanctions was established. According to this, 
member states taking the decision to impose sanctions have to prepare a ‘Common Position’ 
in the framework of the CFSP. Since certain areas concern national competencies and others 
the EU competencies, the implementation of certain sanctions falls into different frameworks. 
Visa bans, arms embargoes and diplomatic sanctions fall under national competencies, thus 
practiced by the member states. Financial sanctions, flight bans and partial trade measures fall 
within the EU competences and depend upon the adoption of a Council Regulation (Ibid.). 
Before the Treaty of Maastricht, Presidency Statements or Council Conclusions used to be 
main documents for the announcement of sanctions. Procedure in the TEU regarding 
sanctions was leading member states to use sanctions against states. This posed a problem for 
the use of sanctions against individuals including terrorists, legal or natural persons and non-
state entities. With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, this problem has been solved 
(Laursen 2010: 13). 
In broad terms, sanctions may be defined as the influence of one party (the sender) on another 
party (the target) through measures. As mentioned above, international law does not consist of 
a fixed definition on sanctions. Due to this legal uncertainty over the term ‘sanctions’, EU 
prefers to use the ‘restrictive measures’ more than the term ‘sanctions’ (Portela 2010: 20-21). 
The terms ‘sanctions’ and ‘restrictive measures’ are used interchangeably as 2004 document 
entitled “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)” indicates it. 
Prescription of the ‘Basic Principles’ by the member states coincides with the time when the 
EU’s sanctions practice was already formed (Portela 2005: 84). Another document explaining 
definition and administration of EU sanctions is “Guidelines on implementation and 
evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU CFSP” that is 
adopted in December 2003. Restrictive measures fall into framework of the CFSP and are 
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applied in accordance with the specific CFSP objectives which highlights the point that EU 
took more active role as security-provider in line with the 2003 European Security Strategy 
(ESS) (Kreutz 2005: 3ff). Objectives of applying sanctions are in line with the objectives 
stated in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union (Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty) which 
are listed as to protect common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of 
the Union in accordance with the UN Charter principles; to consolidate the Union security in 
all ways; to maintain peace and condemn threats to international security; to foster 
international cooperation; to develop and strengthen democracy and the rule of law and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (European External Action Service).  
In due course, the trend in use of sanctions has proceeded towards the use of ‘targeted 
sanctions’. The underlying purpose of such sanctions is to target companies, criminal 
networks, rebel groups or the leaders of a state with an ultimate aim of eliminating the 
influence of sanctions on the innocent individuals, the general population and third countries. 
Thus, measures at question should only be to prevent particular individuals or groups to 
access the needed materials (Eriksson 2005). Such measures include visa ban, travel ban, the 
freezing of funds and assets of the particular individuals. In this context, Eriksson (2005) 
points out that there are no explicitly stated motives explaining the EU’s use of sanctions tools 
against certain individuals.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
3. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Theoretical Approaches to the EU and EU Foreign Policy 
Although the EU was using the sanctions practice abundantly in the past twenty years, the 
research on these practices in the framework of EU foreign policy started relatively later. 
After the creation of CFSP in the nineties and with the increasing sophistication of the 
practice, it has become apparent to talk about EU sanctions policy (Portela 2005: 84). Some of 
the studies on EU sanctions policy focus on the assessment of whether the use of sanctions is 
effective in realizing the objectives (Druláková et. al. 2010; Vines 2012). The same approach 
is applied to different forms of the sanctions such as arms embargoes (Brzoska 2008) and 
financial sanctions (Druláková et. al. 2010). On the other hand, their negative and unintended 
consequences on human rights attract the attention among the academic debate (Léonard and 
Kaunert 2012).   
However, this study does not question the effectiveness of EU sanctions; it rather attempts to 
analyze how the EU uses this instrument in order to understand the EU through one 
instrument of its foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, one debate in academic circles on EU 
foreign policies concerns the interplay between the strategic interests and the normative 
principles. The study carried out by Brummer (2009) views the EU as an actor behaving in 
accordance with neo-realist predictions. He explains the EU’s sanctions policy through three 
different inconsistencies which are related to the triggers for autonomous European sanctions, 
the use of exemptions and the choice of countries for imposing sanction. Although Brummer 
mentions many different countries as to make an illustration of his claims, none of them are 
explained in depth.  
Another study realized by Portela (2005) looks at geographical differentiation of EU sanctions 
and its objectives through comparison of frequencies in the period 1987-2003. The study finds 
that the closer the geographic area to the Union, the more sanctioning objective becomes 
security-related, and overall he finds a balanced relationship between the norms component 
and strategic interests regarding the use of this EU foreign policy tool.  
In fact, the traditional debate was on the existence of European foreign policy (Bull 1982; 
Hoffman 2000; cited in Sjursen 2006: 169). Later on, it turned out to be the aim of finding 
characteristics of EU foreign policy, and the concept of ‘civilian power’ put forward by 
François Duchêne has yielded significant ground for research. According to this view the 
EU’s role in the world politics may be defined by its ability to construct some degree of 
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stability and security through its political and economic tools and not through military tools 
(Sjursen 2006: 169-170). Additionally, “military power” and “normative power” have become 
other ways of conceptualizing the EU’s international role. All terms –“civilian power”, 
“military power” and “normative power”–take their basis from theoretical framework that are 
analyzed within international relations theories. In particular, concepts such as ‘normative, 
civilizing or ethical power’ do have a normative dimension of EU foreign policy (Sjursen 
2006: 169-170). Normative power concept grounds its roots in social constructivism while 
others are used through more realist, liberal and institutionalist explanations. In the literature, 
normative power Europe concept refers the EU as an actor who expands certain normative 
principles that are generally recognized to be universally applicable (Manners 2008). In this 
approach, the EU is considered in terms of its ideational impact on other countries, so the 
power of EU ideas is seen through their diffusion to others (Manners 2002). Over time, the 
EU augmented its activities in the field of security leading to the debate whether the EU’s 
strategic interests are prevailing its norm-based foreign policy (Becher 2003; in Portela 2005: 
87). Hence, it has been more likely to interpret the EU from the perspective of actor-based 
ontologies forming the basis of realist understanding. This approach accepts the pursuit of the 
ethical concerns including international human rights; however, norms and values are treated 
as second order concerns and put behind national security and other national interests in 
importance. Therefore, “member states will only allow the EU act as the repository for shared 
ethical concerns as long as this does not conflict with their core national interests” (Hyde & 
Price 2006: 223).  
Abovementioned information has provided a background on the relationship between the 
strategic considerations and normative basis of EU foreign policy, including sanctions policy, 
yet this needs to be specified further in order to find possible explanations for the use and 
non-use of EU sanctions policy. With an aim to comprehend EU sanctions policy better, 
strategic considerations of the EU are taken into consideration in terms of capabilities, 
security interests and economic interests. This will let analyze the role of strategic interests in 
EU foreign policy and its influence on the EU’s use of sanctions. On the other hand, the 
existing explanations regarding the normative power EU are observed and the 
conceptualization of the EU as norm promoter is taken into consideration.  
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3.2 Influence of Capabilities on Motivations to Use Sanctions 
In this section, the focus is directed to the capabilities of the countries and existing 
explanations regarding its influence on a state’s decision, which should be taken into 
consideration while analyzing motivations of the EU for the use of sanctions. The concepts of 
power and capability are focused mainly by realists and the latter is particularly explained by 
structural realist Kenneth Waltz. 
Among other characteristics of units (states) such as ideology, form of government, 
peacefulness, bellicosity, Waltz focuses only on capability because units are understood by 
the analysis of their capabilities, and distribution of capabilities across units is highly 
significant in order to comprehend significant international outcomes (Waltz 1979: 97-98). 
According to Waltz, states’ rank in anarchy changes depending on certain items which are 
“size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, 
political stability and competence” (Ibid.). The explanation of the Waltz’s concept of 
capability is by no mean arbitrary. In the international structure, international distribution of 
power and capabilities has a significant influence on the behavior of states and “states have to 
be sensitive to the capabilities of other states” (Waltz 1989, in Baylis & Smith 2001: 169). 
Similarly, relative capabilities of the sender vis-à-vis the target is of particular importance. If 
the sender has more bargaining leverage over the target, it will be more capable of inflicting 
weakening costs on the target (Nooruddin 2002: 62). If the potential target country has more 
bargaining leverage, it will be more capable of deterring the imposition of sanctions by the 
sender. However, as Weiss (1999: 500) puts it “sanctions are ideal when governments have no 
perceived vital interests.” Yet, neo-realists would argue that a state’s national interests which 
may be indicated as economic and security interests (Hazelzet 2001: 23) are main factors 
behind the decision of the use and non-use of sanctions. 
This information is significant in understanding the EU’s decisions and political behavior as 
well. Although the EU is not a nation-state and not a sovereign actor, it takes action in 
accordance with the ‘collective interests of its member states’ (Hyde-Price 2006: 220). Then, 
comprehension of the premises of nation state in international politics will be good starting 
point in order to understand the EU.  
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3.3 The Role of Strategic Interests in the Use of Sanctions 
3.3.1 Security Interests  
What determines a country’s security interests may be indicated in accordance with perceived 
threats. Size of a country, for instance, may shape the perceptions of threat. Small countries as 
compared to large countries are perceived less threatening when they are involved in a hostile 
activity. Nevertheless, being engaged in a terrorist activity or having nuclear weapons 
capability may also make very small countries threatening (Hazelzet 2001: 24), and similarly 
a powerful country may not become a threatening factor as long as it has benign intentions 
(Drezner 1999: 34, in Hazelzet 2001: 24). Problem is the difficulty of comprehending 
intentions of other states.  
What is more, it is not only powerful states in terms of economy and military or weak states 
with possession of other capabilities perceived as threats, but it is also failed states that are 
perceived as threats since they pose risks to international security. Thus, an agenda regarding 
the human rights and governance are not necessarily formed with a normative pro-activism 
but to a large extent as a response to rising international crime, terrorism, migration and 
instability which occur due to failed states. These are mostly directed at Europe. Hence, the 
EU has an interest in maintaining stability (Youngs 2004; Antczak 2010: 26). Therefore, what 
motivates a foreign policy may vary. Neo-realism accepts the influence of normative 
considerations on states’ motivations, but adds that national security and other main national 
interests take the first order in importance (Hyde-Price 2006: 222). 
A country may impose sanctions on another state due to human rights violations so that it may 
retrieve stability and international security which is a favorable condition for it. As Eaton and 
Engers (1992: 900) indicate sender would like to influence the target’s actions because “it has 
the power to harm the target but at a cost to itself”. However, as it is interpreted from a 
neorealist perspective, this cost should not undermine the sender’s strategic interests; 
otherwise, imposition of sanctions will be less likely.  
3.3.2 Economic Interests 
Another approach in explaining variation on imposing sanctions is the cost calculations of the 
sender. Sanction will be an applicable option if the expected price of sanctioning is low for 
the sender (Hazelzet 2001: 27). If the sender is eager to pay higher costs, its policy stance 
against the target country is perceived more ‘credible’. Then, a country is perceived more 
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willing to promote human rights ideals as long as it keeps enduring economic sacrifice (Ibid.: 
9). In case a country pursues to have relations with violators of the international rights, it is 
seen as ignorant “at best” and complacent “at worst” (Ibid.: 11). On the other hand, Drezner 
(1999: 5) argues that if the target is an adversary, senders will be eager to use sanctions even 
in a situation that senders have only slightly less ‘costs of deadlock’ than the target.  
In addition to these, “sanctions, like any coercive threat, only occur when a threat is credible 
but not sufficiently severe to bring about compliance” (Hovi 1998; Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 
2005; in Lektzian & Souva 2007: 855). Credible sanction means that although both the sender 
and target is affected by the sanction, the costs of sanction on the sender become less than the 
costs on the target (Nooruddin 2002: 61, 62). In case there is a great economic 
interdependence between the sender and target, the threat posed by the sender becomes severe 
but noncredible (Lektzian & Souva 2007: 855). Similarly, trade interdependence is influential 
in the decision of sanctions initiation. As the level of interdependence in trade increases, 
sender may have more capacity to take action; but, at the same time, the sender will be 
exposed to the larger potential damage, which in turn makes taking action less likely (Ibid.: 
860). In this sense, being dependent on vital sources coming from outside country such as raw 
materials, food, fuel put a nation’s national security and national economy under threat. This 
is, on the other hand, one approach to define economic security. Any interruption in import of 
supply due to war, foreign sanctions, revolution or accident can significantly harm the 
national economy (Cable 1995: 313). Therefore, the likelihood of interdependence between 
the EU and target can affect the EU’s motivations to take action. This may be understood as 
the level of cost posed to the EU and the degree of interdependence between the sender -the 
EU- and the target.  
3.3.3 Sanctions-Strategic Interests Nexus in EU Foreign Policy 
In a transforming international environment the Europe has been willing to increase its profile 
in the world politics and willing to take action on its own on the matters of security and 
defense. Thus, the EU has been involved in an increasing cooperation, institutionalization and 
creation of security institutions such as CFSP. This let the revival of the realism as the implied 
cooperation posed a puzzle for realist predictions and brought the European external interests 
into the scholarly debate (Krotz & Maher 2011). In fact, comprehension of an international 
organization by neo-realists is weak as it is not a state, mainly dealing with ‘low politics’ and 
have scarce coercive power resources; thus, neo-realism cannot yield an explanation for all 
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aspects of foreign and security policy of the EU but is sufficient to explain fundamental nature 
of it as an international actor (Hyde-Price 2006). Although, on one hand, the EU is conceived 
as an actor imposing sanctions for normative principles and supported as it does not use its 
sanctions policy as an ‘aggressive policy tool’ (Kreutz 2005: 42), on the other hand, it is 
criticized due to its interest-based calculations for imposing it.  
For instance, the EU and its foreign policies such as human rights policies are claimed to be 
shaped in accordance with its strategic-utility calculations by Youngs (2004). Similarly, Krotz 
and Maher (2011) state that the EU as an actor in international politics may be defined along 
with its most powerful member states acting according to their own interests, or through the 
role of certain European-level institutions in world politics. They add that what is at stake in 
EU foreign policy considerations is the vital national interests. This explains unsteady patterns 
of cooperation and the restrictions on the scope of cooperation. Youngs (2004) presents the 
correlation between the EU’s strategic considerations and its pursuit of foreign policy. For 
instance, despite the long-standing human rights violations and devastating coups in sub-
Saharan African states, only some of the countries are singled out by the EU through its 
human rights measures. The reason for this selection is related to their influence on regional 
stability, because the EU uses human rights conditionality and its response mechanism, 
mostly in the cases where human rights violations cause instability (Youngs 2004: 426; 
Antczak 2010). This presents the interplay between the EU’s strategic interests and its foreign 
policy.  
In some cases, the EU is criticized due to its willingness to remove sanctions on the target 
even though there is no significant level of improvements in the conditions that had led the 
sender to impose sanctions. Some of the EU leader’s willingness to lift the arms embargo 
against China and Uzbekistan is an example of this (Brummer 2009: 203). This in turn brings 
the suspicion regarding whether the EU’s strategic interests have the main priority in the 
direction of the Union’s foreign policy. Brummer adds that the cost of taking action has an 
impact on the EU’s decision to use sanctions. Such interest-based calculations are considered 
as limitation on the EU’s image of normative power. 
Additionally, the EU is evaluated in terms of its abilities (Tocci 2008). The power and 
capabilities of the EU, on the one hand, makes the EU able to pursue its interests, on the other 
hand, makes it able to interpret the norms and promote them externally. Tocci (2008: 312) 
states that the EU’s promotion of individual rights over the last decades, especially promotion 
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of certain norms over others, is to a certain extent related to its ability to do so. On the other 
hand, this ability to pursue particular objectives and impose sanctions may not only be used 
for the sake of interests because interests ‘are not and cannot be value or norm free’ 
(Jorgensen 2006: 54). Therefore, one also needs to understand the role of norms and values on 
an actor’s foreign policy. 
3.4 Norm Promotion 
Apart from the abovementioned points, states have a role as the agents spreading their own 
values and norms. Norms may essentially be comprehended as embodiment of a quality of 
‘oughtness’ covering moral assessment which in a way evokes justifications for action. 
International or regional norms define certain standards for the proper behavior of states. 
Norms may start to be created domestically which in later stage may be spread around and 
accepted as international norms through the efforts of various entrepreneurs (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 1998: 893).  
One may wonder what incentives norm entrepreneurs have in promoting norms. 
Understanding this is central to the evaluation of norm entrepreneurs/initiators. In the 
literature, there seems to exist four fundamental points of motivation for norm promotion, 
which may be counted as ideational commitment, empathy, altruism and self-interest 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 898; Goertz & Diehl 1992 and George & Keohane 1980 quoted 
in Björkdahl 2002: 48). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) explain that the use of persuasive tools 
has a cost; hence, one should refer to empathy, altruism and ideational commitment in order 
to explain motivating factors of norm entrepreneurs.  Empathy appears depending on actors’ 
capacity of involvement in others’ feelings or ideas. Result of this may be seen as empathetic 
interdependence which means that entrepreneurs may show interest in others’ welfare even if 
they know that their own material well-being or security will not be influenced by this. 
Altruism is observed when actors act for the benefit of other actor even though their own 
well-being undergoes a risk to be harmed. Ideational commitment, on the other hand, may be 
observed in a deep belief in the ideals and values embodied in the norms, which encourages 
the motivation to promote norms or ideas although this does not end up with the well-being of 
entrepreneur. This does not necessarily mean that norm entrepreneurs act against their 
interests. They instead redefine understanding of their interests (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 
898). Lastly, self-interest may explain the incentive of an actor in promoting norms. This 
means adoption of ideas by others may be in the benefit of entrepreneurs; however, it may be 
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difficult to differentiate whether behavior is shaped by norm-influenced interests or pure self-
interest. When pure self-interests dominate norm-based interests, norms would be just used to 
cover the behavior based on self-interest (Goertz & Diehl 1992; in Björkdahl 2002: 48). From 
another perspective, primary motivating factor may become to provide benefits to other states, 
yet at the same time separation of ‘benefits to oneself from those to other’ may be difficult 
(George & Keohane 1980; in Björkdahl 2002: 48). 
For a normative power, what is significant is to be norm entrepreneur who actively engages in 
the creation of new norms based on the notion of appropriateness or desirable behavior in 
their community. And, norm entrepreneurs are the main norm promoters who try to convince 
other states to accept new norms which emerge in a highly competitive normative space 
where there occurs a contest with other alternative norms and perceptions of interest 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 896-897). Being normative and power itself seems 
contradictory, yet interesting to analyze. As Ian Manners (2002) put it, the notion is about the 
‘power over opinion’ or ‘ideological power’. Norm promoter deals with various ways of 
promoting norms; in other words, strategies, for persuasion of others which cover the 
conditionality and instruments incentives, including positive and negative incentives. A norm 
entrepreneur may also use coercive measures such as pressure, sanctions and shaming to force 
a ‘norm taker’ to adopt norms (Björkdahl 2002: 102). 
3.4.1 Sanctions and Norms in EU Foreign Policy 
The EU presents itself as an international actor basing upon normative principles (Sjursen 
2006: 235). Tocci (2008) states that this normative basis dates back to the time of 
enlightenment that became influential on the direction of foreign policy. However, it was after 
a considerable period of time when the EU was discussed in terms of its normative qualities in 
its external relations.  Especially Ian Manners (2002: 241) described the EU as a normative 
power. He explains that EU has based its external relations as conditional on a catalogue of 
norms, which are seen in certain policy objectives such as rule of law, the consolidation of 
democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, on which the EU is 
founded. Manners (2002) indicates that by inserting new ‘founding principles’, the EU is 
strengthening its commitment to those principles. For instance, in 1997 the addition of new 
“founding principles in art. 6 and, together with corresponding references to applicant states 
(art. 49) and sanctions for failing to respect these principles (art. 7), demonstrate the extent to 
21 
 
which the Treaty of Amsterdam marked a move towards greater importance for these 
principles in the EU” (Manners 2002: 246).  
According to Manners (2002), previous conceptualizations of the EU as civilian and military 
power are problematic since these concepts define the EU very much on state-like features. 
This prevents the comprehension of the EU’s international identity. Hence, Manners with the 
concept normative power aims to provide better explanation for the EU’s international 
identity while still paying attention to the EU characterization as civilian and military power. 
Manners also pulls attention to the EU’s ‘ability’ to set the international norms which are 
beginning to be accepted as ‘normal’ in international arena as well as its ability to promote 
these norms.  
Norms and values that the EU aims to promote are embedded in the EU’s policies, treaties, 
criteria and conditions. Manners (2002) highlights five of the norms which are central to the 
EU and these are peace, liberty, the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. These norms have a constitutive character shaping the EU’s 
international identity. Thus, the EU is expected to follow norms and values attached to its 
identity. However, this is not sufficient to be a real normative power since the EU should also 
spread these norms. Diffusion of the norms can be either intentional or unintentional and both 
may take place simultaneously. The EU spreads the norms unintentionally through its 
strategic communications and new policy initiatives, and intentionally through sanctions, 
rewards, technical assistance or conditionality that refers to the usage of carrots or sticks 
(Manners 2002). In the literature it is stated that the EU has tendency towards using positive 
sanctions as compared to negative sanctions (De Vries & Hazelzet 2005; Tocci 2008).  
As Bicchi (2006: 291) mentions in his study, intentional promotion of norms externally by the 
EU with a rationalist interpretation is connected to the EU benefits in some way. A normative 
action for instance may be taken as a result of calculations of the advantages in an interested 
area. Hence, the EU knows the outcomes of its policies beforehand. As consistent with 
abovementioned points of motivations for norm promotion, such an action is included in the 
framework of self-interested behavior. 
In this context, some authors attempt to conceive the EU’s use of sanctions on the scale of 
norms-based and interest-based factors. Hazelzet (2001), as a result of his study combining 
quantitative and qualitative research, finds that in the period 1989 and 2000, economic and 
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security concerns did not prevent the EU to react to human rights violations through 
sanctions.  
Hazelzet (2001) examines not only EU reactions but also US reactions to human rights 
violations by forming wide-range of dataset, including cases and non-cases in which no 
measures are applied, and compare the EU and US. Other studies mentioned earlier (Brummer 
2009, Portela 2005) mainly study by making use of many case-countries or by focusing on the 
effectiveness of the use of sanctions (Druláková et. al. 2010; Vines 2012; Brzoska, 2008).     
 
Differently from these studies, this study will attempt to conduct an updated and in-depth 
research and find the EU’s motivations regarding both the use and non-use of sanctions and 
other reactions by using EU official documents and also through the analysis of three case-
countries. In the literature, considering the absence of a study regarding EU motivations and 
lack of a study realized with limited samples in depth, this study is considered to provide 
significant information regarding an EU foreign policy tool, sanctions. 
3.5 Propositions and Operationalization
1
 
Sanctions are fundamentally used to uphold respect for human rights by coercing violators to 
change their inappropriate behavior; however, the actual motivation to use sanctions may vary 
when strategic and interest-based calculations are involved in the decision-making process. 
This may result in the violators in question not being subjected to sanctions. Thus, it is 
important to understand what motivates the EU’s use and non-use of sanctions. Previous 
research presents the role of norms and strategic interests when applying sanctions related to 
EU foreign policy. The abovementioned explanations help in constructing the hypotheses 
which are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: If the EU acts strategically, we would see variations in the use of sanctions 
depending on the strategic interests (economic and security interests) and capabilities of the 
Union.  
                                                             
1 Some of the variables used in this section such as “stated motivations, actions, policies, understanding of 
democracy” are similarly used in the study of Hankins, J. M. (2012) “Democracy to the Arab World?: Exploring 
the motivations for EU Democracy Promotion through the European Neighborhood Policy” with an aim to 
understand EU democracy promotion towards its Southern Neighborhood. In my thesis, these variables will help 
to understand the EU’s use and non-use of sanctions. 
23 
 
Hypothesis 2: If the EU acts with normative motivations, we would see variations in the use 
of sanctions depending on the state of human rights and democracy in the specific third state. 
Operationalization of these propositions will be done through looking at the EU’s actions, 
policies and stated motivations, as well as its perception of threat and understanding of norms 
with regards to human rights and democracy.  
Stated motivations may be expressed as motivations that the EU presents itself for the use of 
sanctions in its official documents. Discovering a motivation is important as it is the essential 
basis of taking an action, which will be useful for the comprehension of the use and non-use 
of sanctions. From the perspective of the neo-realism theory, stated motivations will be placed 
in the documents strategically and they may include normative values which are pushed to the 
second order when strategic interests come into play. Within the normative understanding, 
stated motivations will greatly emphasize norms and values.  
Policies/actions will emphasize attention on understanding of how responsive the EU is to 
certain developments and to what extent the actions/policies conform to stated motivations. 
This study begins with an understanding that the EU applies sanctions selectively and the 
analysis of the scope of the policies and other actions taken against the countries in question 
will present whether and to what extent strategic interests or norms come into play. Neo-
realism theory suggests that strategic interests shape the policies/actions. Normative theory 
suggests that the norms are prioritized and proper actions/policies are used as a response to 
the violations in question.  
Table 1: Applying the theories to the variables 
 Neo-realism Social Constructivism/ 
Normative theory 
Stated motivation Strategic (normative, in second 
order) 
Normative  
Understanding of norms Focus on norms changes in 
accordance with strategic 
interests 
Constant focus on norms/ 
changes in accordance with the 
developments.  
Policies/Actions Change in accordance with 
strategic interests 
Proper policies/reactions 
against the developments (i.e. 
human rights violations) in 
accordance with norms–  
change for the promotion of 
norms 
Perception of threat Threat to security/stability & 
trade/economy, changes with 
variation in the 
capabilities/intentions of third 
Threat to normative values, 
changes with variation in the 
identity of third country 
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Perception of threat will be explained briefly in order to understand what threatens the EU 
and how the EU perceives third countries. A norm promoter would perceive countries with a 
different identity as a threat, specifically if the EU’s normative values are affected. A realist 
would indicate that strategic interests and maintenance of security, which may depend on 
trade and economic interdependence, are the main factors influencing the perception of threat. 
A change in the capabilities and intentions would affect the perception accordingly.  
Furthermore, there will be a detailed explanation for the understanding of norms (human 
rights and democracy). The focus on these norms deepen an understanding of which norms 
(detailed below) are emphasized by the EU; and whether or not the EU reacts to violations of 
certain norms but not others, and whether or not the focus on the norms varies with the 
strategic interests involved.  
Human rights are one of the main political norms that set standards for governments, 
institutions, and regulate their actions/policies. Nickel (2013) states that human rights do not 
require the best possible results; instead, the main concern is preventing severe abuse. Thus, 
providing and protecting essential standards are sufficient in providing people a good life at 
minimal standards. However, this view on minimal standards is criticized by other writers 
(Brems 2009) since this mindset will restrain the realization of ideal human rights agendas 
and lead to the ‘lack of interest’ for certain developments as the concern is whether or not the 
border is crossed. Brems (2009) also emphasizes the centrality of the ‘violation’ in human 
rights discourse. The drawback with this is that “the uniform term ‘violation’ hides the 
distinctions between more or less serious violations” (Brems 2009: 354). Thus, one can say 
that human rights and their violations are understood not in terms of their degree but in terms 
of their existence/non-existence, and securing minimal standards is the main concern. 
With this understanding, Brems (2009) defined four modest elements meeting minimal 
standards for human rights, which are: a) civil and political rights b) minority and group rights 
c) environmental rights d) social rights. He elaborates on these norms further. Except one 
point (right to enjoy clean, healthy and sustainable environment), they corresponds with the 
main principles of human rights stated in the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), 
which are “right to life, right to liberty and security, right to fair trial, right to respect for 
private and family life, right to an effective remedy, prohibition of torture, prohibition of 
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discrimination, prohibition of slavery and forced labor, no punishment without law, freedom 
of movement, abolition to death penalty, right to appeal in criminal matters, freedom of 
expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of assembly and 
association, right to free elections”.  
The last four norms of human rights are same with the fundamental elements of ‘democracy’. 
The remaining essential elements of democracy according to two resolutions of the UN’s 
General Assembly are: “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the 
rule of law, transparency and accountability in public administration, the right to take part in 
the conduct of public affairs either directly or through freely chosen representatives, a 
pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, the separation of powers and the 
independence of the judiciary, free, independent and pluralistic media” (OPPD 2009). As 
stated in OPDD (2009) document, the EU’s view of democracy is best understood in line with 
democracy definition detailed in two resolutions of the UN’s General Assembly as the EU has 
not set an explicit democracy definition. 
These concepts drawn from previous studies and theoretical framework have guided the 
operationalization and will do so for data collection and analysis in order to respond to 
challenges in constructing external validity. Furthermore, multiple sources of evidence have 
been used to clarify ‘understanding of norms’ and these sources agrees upon the same facts 
that constructs validity in another significant way (Yin 2009: 40-42). Overall aim of these 
operational measures is to understand a specific EU foreign policy and to what extent it is 
norm-driven or interest-driven. Another researcher may apply findings regarding EU foreign 
policy to the analysis of another similar international organization that make it possible to 
generalize the findings of this study (Marshall and Rossman 2011: 252).  
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4. Methods and Data 
4.1 Analytical Approach and Design  
There are several theoretical explanations about the EU’s behavior, and in this respect some 
critiques against EU sanctions policy have been highlighted in the research field regarding the 
rational/realist behavior of the EU in its foreign policy. However, such claims are more 
appropriate to make after describing the stated motivations of the EU and explaining the 
extent of their conformity with its actual practices basing upon in depth analysis of the cases. 
For this aim, perspective will be to understand to what extent the EU’s behaviors/reactions 
against the third countries vary in accordance with normative values or strategic interests. The 
causes or intermediary factors influencing EU reactions that may be seen as non-use of 
sanctions on certain countries will be another point to explain.  
These will be analyzed through a qualitative research with a deductive approach. What is 
intended with qualitative research is to comprehend a specific situation, role, group, or 
interaction. Thus, the research is shaped in the way researcher’s sense of social phenomenon 
through an investigative process and by comparing, contrasting and classifying the study 
object (Creswell 2003: 22). Furthermore, in social sciences, theories are the main tools to 
answer questions. Therefore, it is essential to understand the role of theory in empirical 
research (Vaus 2001). This research will be done with deductive approach. Deductive 
approach begins with a theory, and observations are derived from the theory/theories. Some 
propositions are developed in order to observe whether certain things in the real world follow 
the theory. In the latter stage, correctness of predictions is assessed (Ibid.). For this purpose, 
this study will be conducted in accordance with certain hypotheses shaped with theoretical 
understandings. 
As stated before, the EU uses various means within its foreign policy, such as technical 
assistance, financial aid, diplomacy, and sanctions are one of them. Among other foreign 
policy options, sanctions are preferred to be used as a last step (European Parliament) and by 
“no doubt” it is a very powerful EU foreign policy tool. Those criticizing sanctions call them 
“war by other means” or the “nuclear option” (Gebert 2013: 2). Hence as the most serious 
reaction within EU foreign policy, it is best to take sanctions predominantly as the basis of 
this study in order to really test how important the normative motives weigh, in relation to the 
more strategic interests.  
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The topic of EU sanctions policy may be described as a case of EU foreign policy since there 
is a choice of a particular policy among several other policies of the EU and the analysis of 
this particular policy may help to understand the EU in terms of its principles and values as 
well as its interests and choices, accordingly the EU’s foreign policy.  
There are certain limitations in the thesis. This study will be done on a limited number of 
documents and case countries. That’s why this topic may also be searched through other 
relevant documents and supported with a wider dataset including in-depth analysis of other 
case countries. Furthermore, since this study is conducted with a qualitative technique, 
numeric data are not provided. Yet studying this topic with a quantitative research design may 
provide more comprehensive information regarding this study which presents descriptive 
information with regard to the EU’s sanctions. Additionally with a purpose of finding EU 
actual motivations, the Country Strategy Papers will be used. They have been found 
appropriate for this study’s purpose as they cover the EU’s practices and strategies. However, 
being dependent on the EU’s own statements may be counted as a limitation of this study. 
Nevertheless, since there is no other official document providing needed information, this 
study will be dependent on the EU’s own official documents for finding the EU’s actual 
motivations. 
4.2 Case Selection 
Following a case-study design and the sampling procedure, the countries chosen for the 
analysis are the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine. The main criteria for selecting the 
countries is the existence of the violations such as respect for human rights and democratic 
principles in the countries against whom sanctions have been imposed or the possibility of 
imposing sanctions came to agenda but not used (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Country comparison  
 Belarus Russia Ukraine 
Population (2013, July estimation) 9,625,888 142,500,482 44,573,205  
GDP per capita (PPP) (2012 
estimation) 
$16,000  $17,700  $7,600  
EU trade (million Euro) (2011)  11 437,4 306 627,1 36 172,3 
EIU  Democracy  Index  2010/2011 
(0 = authoritarian regime  
10 =  full democracy) 
 
3.34/3.16 
 
4.26/3.92 
 
6.30/5.94 
Human Rights Risk Index 2012 High  Extreme  High  
28 
 
The use of sanctions Used  Not used Not used  
Sources: CIA World Factbook; European Commission DG Trade Statistics; Economist Intelligence Unit 
Democracy Index; Maplecroft Human Rights Risk Atlas 2012; Portela 2010; Amnesty International 2012; 
Human Rights Watch. 
Table 2 presents three similar countries in terms of high risk in violation of human rights. In 
addition to these, the countries have similarities in history, geography, cultural aspects but 
differ in terms of size, population and wealth. Furthermore, Table 2 demonstrates Russia 
having a high trade volume with the EU while Ukraine and Belarus lag behind in terms of 
volume of trade with the EU. According to 2011 European Commission DG Trade statistics, 
Belarus is only the 43th trading partner of the EU; Ukraine is the 22
nd 
and Russia is the 3
rd
 
trading partner of the EU. Designed economic system of Belarus has made the investment in 
Belarus less likely for the EU. Also its territory is poor in terms of raw materials. On the other 
hand, Belarus is a transit country between the EU and Russia to deliver energy supplies 
(Tocci 2008: 35). In terms of GDP per capita Belarus is better than its neighbor Ukraine and 
relatively worse than Russia. Ukraine like Belarus is a transit country for Russian gas supplies 
to the EU. The EU does not have a membership perspective for Ukraine (Tocci 2008). Russia 
is, on the other hand, significant for the EU due to its role in the Union’s energy security.  
This study will try to deduce to what extent the EU acts in accordance with normative 
motivations or strategic interests through varying features of three case-countries that are 
similar in terms of state of human rights. As seen in the above explanations and table 2, the 
countries differs with regards to their capabilities such as resources, economic capability, and 
from the most capable to the less capable country, the order follows Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus. By looking at how these varying features of the countries causes variation in the 
EU’s behaviors, the study will try to understand the EU’s motivations for using, or not using, 
sanctions as a part of its foreign policy.  
4.3 Data Selection 
Aim of gathering data is to conduct content analysis in order to uncover stated motivations of 
the EU for its use or non-use of sanctions and to reveal if the stated motivations of the EU in 
the documents match with its actual motivations. Therefore, the data for empirical study will 
be derived from the official documents and policy papers which are prepared by EU 
institutions. One type of material is Communications from the Commission and Joint 
Communications from the Commission and the High Representative. Especially final versions 
of these texts are chosen in order to produce interpretations on the basis of concluded views. 
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The Commission is representative of the EU internationally while keeping an eye on the 
interests of the EU, where the Communications produced by the Commission with purpose of 
communicating with respective EU institutional bodies carry the feature of being 
representative of the EU. This provides an appropriate basis to use these documents as they 
represent the EU. In particular, two Communications from the Commission and one Joint 
Communication will be used to find stated motivations. These Communications from the 
Commission are (1) the European Union’s role in promoting human rights and 
democratization in third countries (COM 2001/252 final) (2) Governance in the European 
consensus on development towards a harmonized approach within the European Union (COM 
2006/421 final); and Joint Communication is (3) Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart 
of EU external action–towards a more effective approach (COM 2011/886 final). Another 
type of empirical material is Country Strategy Papers which provide an analysis of particular 
country situation relating to human rights, the rule of law and democratization as they are 
significant instruments “for defining strategies and results to be achieved at the country level” 
(SEC 2000/1049). The Country Strategy Papers define the EU’s strategies for the time period 
2002-2006 and 2007-2013 which makes possible to analyze the EU from 2002 to 2013. 
Council Conclusions and Common Positions will also be used to track the process within each 
country over time and discover actual motivations of the EU for the use and non-use of 
sanctions.  
4.4 Processing the Data 
 4.4.1 Processing the Communications 
With an aim to comprehend stated motivations of the EU for using, or not using, sanctions 
and regarding other reactions, content analysis will be applied to three Communications. 
These documents will be examined by looking at the EU’s understanding of norms (human 
rights and democracy), actions, policies and expressions regarding sanctions. The categories 
are determined as a result of the content analysis, and stated motivations will be assessed 
within the framework of those categories.  
Qualitative content analysis “focuses on the characteristics of language as communication 
with attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text” (Budd, Thorp & Donohew 
1967, Lindkvist 1981, McTavish&Pirro 1990, Tesch 1990; in Hsieh & Shannon 2005). 
Moreover, qualitative content analysis examines “language intensely for the purpose of 
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classifying large amounts of texts into an efficient number of categories” (Weber 1990; in 
Hsieh & Shannon 2005). Therefore, the materials will be examined accordingly. 
 4.4.2 Processing Other EU Official Documents  
Qualitative content analysis will also be applied mainly to the EU’s Country Strategy Papers 
with an objective of understanding the EU’s actual motivations and their conformity with the 
stated motivations. The documents will be examined in line with the perception of threat, 
actions/policies and understanding of norms as detailed in the operationalization section.  
In this study where the effort is to understand motives for using the restrictive measures as the 
most serious reaction within EU foreign policy and the extent of the EU’s use of sanctions in 
line with normative or strategic causes, the research questions as stated in chapter 1.1 will be 
researched. The second question will be answered through the Communications, and the first 
and the third question will be answered by scrutinizing mainly the Country Strategy Papers 
through content analysis.  
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5. Results and Analysis 
5.1 Examination of the Documents to Explore EU Stated Motivations  
In this section, objective is to make content analysis of the Communications. These materials 
will be examined by looking at the EU’s understanding of norms (human rights and 
democracy), expressions regarding sanctions, actions and policies. The categories are 
identified by making use of the content analysis and stated motivations are assessed in 
accordance with those categories. 
 5.1.1 Processing the Communications 
5.1.1.1 The European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and 
Democratization in Third Countries (COM 2001/252) 
The Communication presents the EU as a “substantial political and moral weight” as well as 
an “economic and political player”. In order to explain the EU’s political and moral weight, 
the Communication emphasizes on member states’ identities attached to democratic values 
and their commitment to promote these principles in their internal and external policies (COM 
2001/252: 3), and the EU’s role as an economic and global player is explained by referring to 
its ability of ‘global diplomatic reach’ and ‘substantial budget for external assistance’. This 
explanation provides basis for arguing that EU has ‘both influence and leverage’ that can be 
used for the objectives of promoting democratization and human rights in third countries 
(COM 2001/252: 4). The emphasis on influence and leverage can be evaluated as a relational 
perception of the EU's own capabilities vis-à-vis third countries. Having this influence and 
leverage politically, morally and economically is seen fundamental to realize the EU’s 
objectives of democratization and promoting respect of human rights. This explanation 
provides a background for the following statement:  
“The third country may have no genuine commitment to pursue change through dialogue and 
consultation, and negative measures may therefore be more appropriate” (COM 2001/252: 8).  
In this statement, the Communication reveals that the EU has a ‘substantial weight’ to push 
the third country to realize ‘change’ through negative measures, and the success in this sense 
seems to be the main objective of the EU, since in cases where ‘dialogue and consultation’ are 
not effective to encourage third country to pursue change, the EU may consider using 
sanctions. Apart from these, the language used in above cited sentence indicates that the EU 
avoids to be perceived as threatening. In other words, the EU could be perceived as 
threatening if the sentence was, for instance, formed with an ‘If’ clause rather than merely 
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stating “may have no genuine commitment (…)”. Similarly, in the rest of the Communication, 
there is an effort to explain the EU’s intention which should not be associated with a 
‘negative’ or ‘punitive approach’ (COM 2001/252:  9) that may be observed in the following 
statements:  
“However the EU's insistence on including essential elements clauses is not intended to 
signify a negative or punitive approach.” (COM 2001/252: 9) 
“It [the EU] pursues a positive approach by promoting social development through incentives 
and capacity-building measures, rather than sanctions.” (COM 2001/252: 8) 
In the latter statement, there is comparison between ‘a positive approach’ and ‘sanctions’ 
which indirectly associates sanctions with a negative approach. It is also understood from the 
use of ‘sanctions’ and ‘negative measures’ interchangeably.  
Another striking point with the first quoted extract -“The third country may have no genuine 
commitment to pursue change through dialogue and consultation, and negative measures may 
therefore be more appropriate”– is that motivation of using sanctions is not related to 
‘violation’ or ‘breach’ of the rights but to achieve a ‘change’ by promoting desired values.  
The Communication states that “all avenues for progress are explored before the EU resorts to 
sanctions” (COM 2001/252: 9). This implies that the EU applies to ‘all avenues’ that refer to 
the actions taken through ‘dialogue’, ‘consultation’, ‘capacity-building measures’, 
‘incentives’ for progress, but in case ‘progress’ cannot be achieved through this way, 
sanctions are taken into consideration. This similarly supports the understanding of 
‘sanctions’ for ‘progress’. 
Other actions taken by the EU are also stated in terms of their focus on the development of 
human rights and democracy. The EIDHR and Tacis as well as Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreements (PCA) are stated as main mechanisms used for these purposes (COM 2002/252: 
26). 
The Communication refers to ‘sanctions’ as one of a wide-range of instruments and as a 
foreign policy instrument that is used to “promote human rights and democratization 
objectives in external relations” (COM 2001/252: 6). However, the understanding of 
‘democratization’ remains vague.  
In this context, the Communication refers to “civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights” (COM 2001/252: 3) to describe human rights which are accepted as universal and 
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indivisible. On the other hand, it specifies the understanding of democracy and emphasizes 
that democracies should be “functioning” and “participatory”, and governments should be 
“accountable, democratic and pluralist” (COM 2001/252: 4). Absence of these elements is 
associated with “corrupt and autocratic governments” and “conflict and instability” (COM 
2001/252: 4).  
 Some striking points in this document are that the use of ‘sanctions’ or ‘negative measures’ 
are primarily stated as being motivated by the objectives of upholding respect for human 
rights and democratization process as well as by the objective of ‘change’ or ‘progress’ in the 
third country. The EU’s ‘substantial weight’ is expressed as serving to this purpose. On the 
other hand, the existence of functioning and participatory democracy is observed as a 
significant factor for preserving stability.  
5.1.1.2 Governance in the European Consensus on Development (COM 2006/421) 
This Communication highlights significance of good/democratic governance, human rights 
and democracy for achieving sustainable development, and ‘development’ is presented crucial 
for the maintenance of ‘peace and security’ (COM 2006/421: 3). As the Communication 
states that “development, human rights, peace and security are indivisible and mutually 
reinforcing” (COM 2006/421: 3). These casual relations mean changes in one area give way 
to changes in other areas that provide an understanding with regards to the motivation of the 
EU’s promotion of democratic governance, human rights and democracy. 
The main means of promoting these objectives are mentioned as ‘political dialogue’ and 
‘development aid programming’ (COM 2006/421: 3), but also ‘sanctions’ when ‘necessary’ 
(COM 2006/421: 7). The relationship between ‘dialogue’ and ‘sanctions’ will be explained 
further below in accordance with the following extract. 
“Dialogue must be the preferred means of encouraging countries to embark on reforms. 
Unilaterally imposing new conditions must be avoided. Dialogue must have a substantial 
preventive dimension and permit the discussion of often politically sensitive issues such as 
respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, the reform of security 
systems, economic and financial governance, the management of natural and energy resources 
and matters of social governance. Sanctions may nevertheless prove necessary in serious 
cases. In such instances incentive approaches must also be developed to remedy the problems 
identified.” (COM 2006/421: 7) 
Based on this extract, one may state that ‘dialogue’ represents mutual relations and processes 
while ‘sanctions’ represent a unilateral process, and if the conditions in problematic third 
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country continue despite a mutual dialogue, sanctions may be an option. Furthermore, it 
expresses the applicability of sanctions with the purpose of encouraging reforms in the third 
countries. However, the use of dialogue is emphasized as primary approach.  It is stated that 
dialogue should allow discussion of “politically sensitive issues” and has a “preventive 
dimension”. Furthermore, it is expressed that dialogues are a way to develop new approaches 
for improving the conditions that are expected to end by the imposition of sanctions and 
encourage third countries for reform. 
Nevertheless, the Communication particularly emphasizes that tendency of the EU is towards 
using ‘dialogue’ more than ‘sanctions and conditions’ because “the processes of democratic 
governance will be supported more effectively by dialogue than by sanctions and conditions” 
(COM 2006/421: 20). However, this does not mean that sanctions will not be used for the 
stated purposes. Rather, it means sanctions and conditions will not be as effective as dialogue 
for the processes of democratic governance. One may say that sanctions also have a role in 
‘the processes of democratic governance’ and in ‘serious cases’ regarding ‘politically 
sensitive issues’ (see above extract).   
The Communication describes ‘democratic governance’ by referring to a wide-range of 
elements including ‘respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms; support for 
democratization processes; human security; management of migration flows; sustainable 
management of natural and energy resources and of the environment; the promotion of 
sustainable economic growth’ (COM 2006/421: 5) and so forth. On the other hand, 
‘democratic governance’ is associated with the eradication of ‘poor governance’ and 
elimination of the challenges such as ‘violations of human rights’, ‘armed conflict’ that occurs 
due to poor governance (i.e. of natural resources) (COM 2006/421: 6). Besides, the 
Communication adds “good governance is more than tackling corruption” (COM 2006/421: 
5). Thus, it is not a matter of crossing the border between good governance and bad 
governance (dominated by corruption and human rights violations), but going beyond the 
borderline towards good governance. From another standpoint, it is revealed that there is a 
precautionary stance for not crossing the border because, as observed, ‘dialogue’ is added ‘a 
substantial preventive dimension’ (COM 2006/421: 7). Something bad, related to ‘politically 
sensitive issues’ which include ‘human rights’, ‘democratic principles’ but also ‘economic 
and financial governance’, ‘the management of natural and energy resources’, which may lead 
to human rights violations is attempted to be prevented through dialogue but if it cannot be 
prevented, ‘sanctions may prove necessary’ (see above extract).  
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Based on this document, it may be highlighted that since “development, human rights, peace 
and security are indivisible and mutually reinforcing” (COM 2006/421: 3), the understanding 
is that eradication of a challenge in one area contributes to the elimination of other challenges 
in some way. Thus, it may be presented that the use of sanctions is motivated not just for 
promoting rights and values in question, but also for providing security or stability in the 
problematic area. Furthermore, it seems that sanctions are motivated to be used in serious 
cases and provide borderline conditions, and then ‘progress’ can be achieved in terms of the 
processes of democratic governance by making the process of using sanctions mutual through 
for instance incentive approaches. 
5.1.1.3 Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – 
Towards a more Effective Approach (COM 2011/886) 
The Communication underlines the challenges posed to human rights and democracy by 
stating some facts in relation to the events of 2011 that occurred in North Africa and Middle 
East. The record continues to not only state the facts, but also it explains the EU’s reactions 
and understanding regarding the developments. The following statement shows both 
simultaneously.   
“At the UN, some States have contested well-established human rights norms, suggesting–
wrongly– that human rights violations can be justified by cultural differences.” (COM 
2011/886: 6) 
For the EU, the cultural differences cannot be an excuse for the human rights violations. This 
understanding matches with the meaning revealed by the title of the section, which is “the EU 
as a global force for human rights” (COM 2011/886: 5). It is not a regional force but a 
‘global’ force, and it is a global arena where one cannot mention unique culture and where the 
EU as an actor uses its force or power for human rights. Another statement of the fact is: 
“The EU has been raising human rights questions and the situation of individuals under threat 
with other countries: in a growing number of human rights dialogues and consultations, at 
political meetings, in diplomatic démarches and publicly. The EU has been offering its advice 
and support in strengthening democratic institutions and human rights, and has taken action to 
impose restrictive measures because of serious human rights violations.” (COM 2011/886: 5) 
In this statement, the EU first prepares a background for legitimizing its use of restrictive 
measures by mentioning about actions taken through ‘human rights dialogues and 
consultations’. From another standpoint, the use of adjective ‘serious’ is remarkable with 
regards to human rights violations. The Communication in 2006 similarly put an emphasis on 
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the use of restrictive measures if a ‘serious’ case2 occurs although there is no an explicit 
reference to human rights violations in that Communication. Above all, the use of adjective 
‘serious’ implies that EU’s approach to the violations of human rights has a degree, meaning 
that human rights violations are not reacted through restrictive measures basing upon just the 
existence of violations.  
Another section in the Communication titled “responding to serious violations” (COM 
2011/886: 16) reveals the same meaning. In this section, ‘asset freezes, arms embargoes or 
visa bans’ are indicated as some of the possible measures that can be taken “in reaction to 
serious human rights abuses in third countries” (COM 2011/886: 16). However, there is no 
expression regarding seriousness of nature within human rights violations.  
The Communication highlights certain norms that are seen essential for human rights and 
democracy. “Freedoms of expression, association and assembly” (COM 2011/886: 7) are 
expressed as main norms underpinning democracy and essential quality for human rights. 
“The rule of law, including access to justice and the right to fair trial” (COM 2011/886: 7), on 
the other hand, are seen as the protector of democratic principles and human rights. These are 
briefly stated with the terms ‘freedom, dignity, equality and justice for all’, and ‘promotion’ 
and ‘protection’ of these goals are expressed as key foreign policy priorities. Similar to the 
points observed in the previous documents, it is stated that promotion and protection of 
human rights and democracy enhance “security, development, economic participation and 
social inclusion” and reinforce international peace, stability, and prosperity (COM 2011/886: 
6, 7).  
Furthermore, the Communication mentions about the concept of “deep democracy” that has 
been introduced through the European Neighborhood Policy. According to the 
Communication, ‘deep democracy’ aims at “setting a baseline of necessary accomplishments 
against which progress can be assessed” (COM 2011/886: 9). That is, there is a need of 
‘baseline’ for real progress to be achieved and the term ‘progress’ refers to the process of 
achievements realized beyond the baseline. Thus, it is possible to indicate that the first 
objective is to establish baseline conditions, and making progress is the second objective. 
Briefly, in this Communication restrictive measures are stated to be used against serious 
violations of human rights rather than just promoting and pursuing a change or progress. As 
                                                             
2 “Sanctions may nevertheless prove necessary in serious cases” (COM 2006/421: 7) 
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observed in the Communication 2001, the EU’s ‘substantial weight’ over the third countries is 
important which grants the EU ability to force, and it is emphasized that this force is used for 
human rights.  
5.1.2 Categories Derived from the Examination of the Documents 
Relevant Communications from the Commission are examined above to understand how the 
EU addresses the topics regarding sanctions, human rights, democracy and to comprehend 
stated motivations for using restrictive measures concerning the breaches of those rights. In 
these documents which are analyzed with content analysis, 5 categories (Appendix 1) have 
been identified concerning human rights, democracy and sanctions. These categories are: 
understanding of human rights and democracy; actions/policies proposed to be used before 
imposing sanctions; the EU’s perspectives with regard to sanctions; self-definition of the 
EU’s own capabilities; stated objectives/reasons of the EU for using sanctions. 
Regarding the understanding of human rights and democracy, the EU states that human rights 
are universal and indivisible, and cultural differences cannot legitimize human rights 
violations. Concerning human rights and democracy, certain norms such as freedom of 
expression, association and assembly, the rule of law, access to justice and the right to fair 
trial are particularly underlined. For the protection of these norms, it is stated that there is a 
need for an environment of peace and security, functioning and participatory democracies, 
accountable, democratic and pluralist governments. The EU emphasizes promotion and 
protection of these norms as its main foreign policy principle. Through this way, the EU also 
aims at reaching stability, democratization and development in the third countries.  
Regarding actions/policies proposed to be used before imposing sanctions, the importance of 
dialogue, consultation, incentives are highlighted to determine policies intended for 
improving and supporting human rights and democracy effectively. Besides, the EU 
emphasizes the necessity of adding a preventive dimension to dialogue. Additionally, 
capacity-building measures, programs are proposed to support the process.  
Concerning EU perspectives regarding sanctions, it is seen that the EU pays attention on 
dialogue and improving mutual relations and tend to resort to these ways more than sanctions. 
Sanctions are attributed a negative meaning and seen as a last resort. It is also possible to 
understand this from the EU’s use of sanctions and negative measures interchangeably.   
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With regard to the Union’s own capabilities, the EU defines itself politically, economically 
and morally influential. This influence and leverage are stated to be used for promoting 
human rights and democracy. In this sense, the EU views itself as a global force. 
In the general sense in three documents, it is observed that stated objectives/reasons of the EU 
for applying sanctions are stated as promoting human rights, democracy and democratic 
governance. While in the COM 2001, sanctions are applied depending on the ‘third country’s 
commitment to pursue change’, in the latter documents it is observed that seriousness of the 
cases and violations are emphasized increasingly as a condition for using sanctions. 
5.1.3 What are the stated motivations of the EU in imposing sanctions? 
The Communications reveal stated motivations of the EU for the use of sanctions/restrictive 
measures as: to react to serious violations of human rights; to uphold human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance, to promote democratization processes; to 
promote good/democratic governance; to maintain peace and security. Content analysis of the 
documents also highlights that the motives regarding the use of sanctions is for ‘change’ or 
‘progress’ and a reaction to ‘serious’ ‘violations’ of human rights. 
The primary stated motivation for the use of restrictive measures is to uphold respect for 
human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance; however, the documents 
express promotion of these values also as a way to reach development and security because 
lack of these values in the third countries is associated with the ‘conflict’ and ‘instability’, in 
turn the exaggeration of violations of human rights.  
The language used in the documents has a convincing tone since there is an aim to convince 
the reader that human rights and democracy are at the centre of the EU’s foreign policy. The 
concepts ‘substantial weight’, ‘global force’, ‘influence’ and ‘leverage’ are used in relation to 
the objectives of promoting ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’. Restrictive measures are also 
used in relation to the concept ‘negative measure’.  
5.2 Understanding EU Actual Motivations through Three Countries 
 
In this part of the study, objective is to understand the EU’s actual motivations through three 
countries by applying content analysis mainly to the EU’s Country Strategy Papers. Other 
relevant EU official documents will also support tracking the process. In the previous section, 
stated motivations of the EU regarding the restrictive measures have been observed, and this 
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section will look at the conformity of these stated motivations with the EU’s actual practices. 
This will provide us more realistic information regarding to what extent the Union’s behaviors 
are normative or strategic.  
 
This section is divided into two as an “active” and “passive” period due to the differentiation 
in the EU’s specified actions/policies as a response to the weaknesses of the countries 
(Belarus, Ukraine, Russia) in terms of human rights and democracy norms.  
 
By using content analysis, the documents will be examined in line with certain categories 
which are human rights and democracy norms as unfolded in operationalization part, the EU’s 
responses (actions/policies) and the EU’s perception of threat.  
 
The objective is to understand which norms the EU focuses on; whether the EU prioritize 
certain norms over others; if so with what purpose/intention; against which norms the EU 
triggers its restrictive measures; how the EU responses to the weaknesses of the countries in 
question, and what factors the EU perceives as a threat. 
 
5.2.1 Processing EU Official Documents 
5.2.1.1 An Active EU (2002-2006) 
In this period the EU’s policies and actions give priority to improve the respected countries’ 
capacity to manage their borders, aid in the transition of the countries towards a market 
economy, but at the same time the promotion of human rights and democracy values through 
various instruments as shown below.  
The country strategy papers (CSP) mention certain “soft” threats such as illegal migration, 
organized crime coming from all the countries in question. In the case of Ukraine inefficient 
judiciary is also seen as a soft threat and as the “the weakest pillar of power” (CSP c: 11) 
although efforts were made through Tacis and EIDHR program. An efficient judicial reform 
is advocated as necessary to tackle problems of organized crime, illegal migration and 
corruption as well as to promote the ability of Ukraine to meet the requirements of  
democracy and a market economy (CSP c: 15,17). However, in Ukraine the influence of 
political elite interests on the judiciary and the use of this influence against political rivals 
raise concerns in terms of a successful judicial reform. Similarly, Russia and Belarus have 
problems regarding the independence of the judiciary (Appendix 2). In the case of Russia, the 
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judicial reform is emphasized due to its prominence for providing appropriate climate for 
business and investment. In the case of Belarus, the point of view is on the necessity of an 
independent judiciary for the promotion of respect for human rights, civil liberties, the 
strengthening of the rule of law and the combating crime effectively (CSP a: 15). These 
differentiations in the departure point of motivation for promoting an independent and 
efficient judiciary show that this norm is associated with the EU’s economic interests in 
Russia. The promotion of this norm is for the EU’s security interests and normative 
considerations in the case of Ukraine and Belarus, but for Belarus the EU emphasizes more on 
its normative considerations. 
The independence of the judiciary is also closely related to the rule of law because the 
absence of an independent judiciary prevents the application of the rule of law. The lack of 
respect for these norms is seen in Belarus in the form of incomplete investigation in the 
disappearances of four prominent people and “impunity for persons responsible for killing or 
injuring individuals” (CSP a: 15). The EU reacts to these negative developments through the 
restrictive measures in the form of the freezing of the assets and visa ban to the persons listed 
in 24 September 2004 (2004/661/CFSP). Ukraine similarly has problems regarding the 
respect for the rule of law. Appropriate application of the rule of law becomes impossible in 
Ukraine when it combines with other problems such as corruption, the increasing power of 
political-financial groups over the authorities, thus it has implications for “serious human 
rights violations”. “Several unresolved murders of journalists” are presented as an example to 
this (CSP c: 6). As a response, the EU requires Ukraine to respect the rule of law and aims to 
strengthen it through the EIDHR program (Appendix 2). In the case of Russia, the rule of law 
is underlined as a key condition for market economy and the conflict in Chechnya is 
considered as a challenge for stability of Russia’s reform process (Appendix 2). The strategy 
paper also highlights the EU’s concerns for human rights violations, and proposes a “political 
solution of conflict and restoring the rule of law in Chechnya” (CSP b: 4). The EU supports 
the process in accordance with the projects with NGOs, Council of Europe and OHCHR 
(Appendix 2). Therefore, it becomes possible to say that in this time period the EU has mixed 
points of motivations for promoting the rule of law. 
Furthermore, regarding the free elections, among the three only Belarus fails to fulfill 
international democratic standards (Appendix 2). Peaceful demonstrations following the 
elections resulted in violence causing “severe human rights violations” as stated on December 
2004 Council Common Position which extended the restrictive measures to the persons 
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responsible for the violations and fraudulent elections (2004/848/CFSP). Suppression of 
peaceful demonstrations is also an obstacle to people’s right to enjoy freedom of assembly.   
The EU reveals its desire for the existence of pluralistic political parties for all countries, and 
it makes it explicit in what is required from Belarus; and what types of concerns and 
hesitations the EU has about the state of political parties in Ukraine and Russia (Appendix 2). 
Thus, in this respect there is an equal stance towards the three countries. The deficiencies 
regarding a pluralistic system of political parties do not become a reason for the use of 
restrictive measures, nor are they prioritized by the EU’s policies and actions.  
With regards to pluralistic system of organizations, the closure of OSCE Assistance and 
Monitoring Group (AMG) office in Belarus is brought to the fore. In the strategy paper, the 
closure of OSCE office together with “other negative developments” is evaluated as 
“reluctance” of Belarus to pursue democratic developments. As a response in 2002, 14 out of 
15 EU Member States determined to apply visa ban on President Lukashenko and seven 
political leaders of Belarus (CSP a: 5). But after the replacement of the old office with a new 
one in 2003, the visa ban has been removed. In addition to these, religious organizations, the 
NGOs, higher education institutions in Belarus are suppressed and they lack freedom. For 
Ukraine the paper states that civil society should have more active role in the political 
development. For Russia, it is seen as the main way of consolidating “democracy, the rule of 
law, media freedom and social safety” (CSP b: 4), and the EU takes actions through EIDHR, 
Tacis and the Institution Building Partnership Program, the partnerships, projects and 
cooperation between the EU’s and those countries’ NGOs, higher education institutions. 
Thus, the EU actively takes actions in the cases of Russia and Ukraine. 
In terms of freedom of assembly and association, the most negative conditions are in Belarus. 
The threat on civil society actors and “serious violations of core trade union rights of ILO” are 
two problems in this respect. The EU displays its response to Belarus with at times harsh and 
other times encouraging and cooperative way depending on the nature of the developments. 
Serious violations of core trade union rights of ILO by Belarus, for instance, are met by a 
temporary withdrawal of EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) from Belarus 
(Appendix 2).  
When it comes to the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, among the three 
countries Ukraine is the one in whose political agenda public opinion has little impact, which 
is where the EU poses criticism against Ukraine and requires it to “foster a more open and 
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structured political debate, with public opinion playing a greater role in the determination of 
Ukraine’s political agenda” (CSP c: 10). For Russia, the strategy paper does not mention 
public opinion, the individuals’ role in public affairs, and there is no requirement from it in 
this respect or any program by the EU for a positive progress. On the other hand, from 2000 
to 2003 the EU supports Belarusian people for an active participation in the development of 
democracy and civil society through the Civil Society Development Program (CSP a: 17).   
The strategy papers in question do not touch upon some of the human rights norms at all. 
These are the right to respect for private and family life, effective remedy, prohibition of 
torture, slavery and forced labor, right to fair trial and abolition to death penalty. Some other 
norms are underlined only in one of the countries. Freedom of movement, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, prohibition of discrimination, the right to appeal in criminal matters 
(Appendix 2). This information on the one hand shows that these norms are not constantly 
involved in all strategy papers, accordingly in the EU’s entire strategy calculations towards 
the third countries. On the other hand, this presents that in this period there are no restrictive 
measures used to uphold these norms, or no circumstances triggering sanctions. 
Concerning the right to life, liberty and security and freedom of expression, the papers raise 
the weaknesses of Belarus and Russia (Appendix 2). Especially regarding the latter, the 
papers reveal the EU’s strong concern. Similarly, all countries have significant deficiencies in 
terms of free, independent and pluralistic media, where Russia and Ukraine
3
 have problems 
regarding transparency and accountability in public administration whereas this information 
is not available for Belarus (Appendix 2). These deficiencies are believed to be managed 
through the instruments other than restrictive measures.  
5.2.1.2 Towards a Passive EU (2007-2013) 
 
In this time period, the EU is passive in terms of addressing deficiencies of the countries, in 
particular Ukraine and Russia, in human rights and democratic values through specified 
policies and actions. However, the judiciary and the rule of law remains as the main areas 
addressed actively. In the case of Russia, the EU focuses mostly on trade-economic 
cooperation, Justice, Freedom and Security (JFS), research, education and culture, 
cooperation in the area of external security (four Common Spaces). In the case of Ukraine, the 
main areas of cooperation are trade, market, regulatory reform, JFS, economic, social reform 
                                                             
3 This period also corresponds with the 2004 “orange revolution” in Ukraine leading the country a reform period 
(CSP f:  4). 
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and development. Promotion of human rights and democracy are addressed through EC 
assistance. For Belarus, the promotion of human rights and democracy remains as the main 
priority, and in this period the EU starts to impose restrictive measures for 
progress/democratization. The policy of “critical engagement” including the Eastern 
Partnership and dialogues accompanies the restrictive measures (European Commission a). 
 
Country strategy papers, similarly to the previous time period, do not place a focus on the 
right to respect for private and family life, effective remedy, prohibition of slavery and forced 
labor. Rarely mentioned are the other norms in the previous section such as freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, prohibition of discrimination and right to appeal in 
criminal matters, which are not brought to the fore this time. However, this time the EU raises 
its concern over death penalty in Belarus. Freedom of movement is touched upon only in the 
case of Russia. Unlike the previous time period, there is a strong concern over the right to fair 
trial in Ukraine (Council of the EU c) and over the reported tortures in Belarus (CSP d: 9) 
and Russia (Council of the EU b). Right to life, liberty and security is underlined in terms of 
insufficient protection of asylum seekers and refugees in Belarus and Russia. The strategy 
paper on Ukraine does not mention this issue as similar to the previous time period. 
Concerning the right to take part in conduct of public affairs is the only strategy paper on 
Russia mentioning about this norm by stating the indifference of Russian citizens to political 
or civic rights, which is not raised in the previous paper on Russia. However, this time the 
papers do not reveal any information for Ukraine and Belarus as contrary to the previous 
papers (Appendix 3). This may indicate that the progress in these fields does not influence the 
strategy towards those countries or the EU does not keep an eye on these developments 
constantly. 
 
The EU does not refer to any “soft” threats in the cases of Ukraine and Belarus, but 
emphasizes the importance of Ukraine for the diversification and security of energy supplies 
since natural gas imported through Ukraine is around 40% (CSP f: 28). On the other hand, the 
paper on Russia highlights the importance of cooperation with Russia for a stable supply of 
energy, the geopolitical stability of the CIS region, environment, nuclear safety and in the 
areas of justice and home affairs (CSP e: 3). Furthermore, the EU perceives instability in the 
neighboring regions as a threat to its security (Appendix 3). The conflict in Chechnya is also 
evaluated in terms of its effects on stability of wider region (Appendix 3). The EU accepts 
that the conflict has humanitarian consequences but only highlights its ‘concern’ regarding the 
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“stabilization, recovery and ultimately the development of the North Caucasus” which is 
supported through the EU financial assistance (Appendix 3).  
  
Furthermore, the strategy paper on Ukraine does not mention issues on the state of judiciary 
even though it is counted among the “soft” threats in the previous paper. Nevertheless, the EU 
supports judicial reform in Ukraine with the assistance and through the European 
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) since 2007 (Appendix 3). Despite this 
background, Ukraine took “politically motivated” decisions to convict the members of the 
former Government in 2012 (Council of the EU c). In return, the EU states its strong concern 
and expectations from Ukraine (Appendix 3). Politically-motivated convictions are also a 
concern in the cases of Russia and Belarus. In particular, “recent constitutional change” in 
Russia weakens the judiciary’s position which has already had a politically-biased position, 
and gives more power to the President (Appendix 3). The EU takes actions for Russia in the 
form of workshops, professional training and in the framework of the Common Spaces 
(Appendix 3).  
 
When it comes to Belarus, this weakness together with other deficiencies disappoints the EU. 
The EU-Belarus relations were restricted through an extension of restrictive measures on 
November 2009
4
 due to “the lack of significant and irreversible progress in key areas of 
democratization” (European Commission a). “So-called democratization criteria” were 
established in the October 2008 GAERC conclusions, and they are: “no more political 
prisoners, progress on electoral legislation, respect for human rights notably freedom of 
expression and of the media, freedom of assembly and political association” (European 
Commission a). Travel ban which was suspended temporarily in October 2008 Conclusions 
was suspended again in the Council Conclusions of 17 November 2009 to encourage progress 
in Belarus. However, travel ban and asset freeze were updated with the 25 October 2010 
Council Conclusions
5
 with a further 12 months travel ban suspension for the objective of 
democratic progress (European Commission a).    
 
As seen above, free elections and freedom of assembly and political association in Belarus are 
other criteria for democratization. On the basis of “serious violations of election standards” 
during December 2010 Belarusian Presidential elections and the use of violence against 
                                                             
4 Council Conclusions on Belarus 2974th External Relations Council meeting Brussels, 17 November 2009. 
5 Council Conclusions on Belarus 3041st Foreign Affairs Council meeting Luxembourg, 25 October 2010. 
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demonstrators and the members of oppositions, the EU extended existing restrictive 
measures
6
 (travel ban and asset freeze) on January 2011
7
 against those responsible (European 
Commission a). In the case of Ukraine, the standards of free elections fluctuate over time. 
While 2006 parliamentary elections were conducted fairly and freely, 2012 parliamentary 
elections failed to achieve the required standards. The opposition leaders could not stand for 
the elections due to unfair trials and convictions; accordingly the EU reveals its expectation 
from Ukraine for upholding OSCE commitments and initiating an inclusive dialogue with the 
opposition (Council of the EU b). In 4 March 2012 Russian Presidential elections, according 
to observation of OSCE there were some shortcomings in the conduct of the elections and the 
voters’ choices were restricted, but there were no interference in the protests 
(MEMO/12/158). The 4 December 2011 Duma elections in Russia, on the other hand, raised 
‘serious concern’ due to procedural violations, biased media, “harassments of independent 
monitoring attempts” and in this respect the EU expressed its expectations from the 
authorities (Council of the EU a). Thus Russia and Ukraine differ from Belarus in terms of 
their tolerance to freedom of assembly and the EU does not use its restrictive measures only 
in the case of failures in the free elections. 
 
The application of the rule of law which is closely related to the independence of the judiciary 
is another problematic area in all countries. The papers point out the arbitrary detention of a 
former Minister Mikhail Marinich in Belarus, the selective application of the rule of law in 
the Yukos Affair in Russia, and arbitrary enforcement and unclear laws in Ukraine (Appendix 
3). The EU makes the promotion of the rule of law as one of its priority areas for all countries; 
explains policy mechanisms planned for use in Ukraine, but for Belarus, a clear indication of 
willingness for progress towards the respect for the rule of law and democracy values is set as 
a precondition for deepening the relationship. Furthermore, the EU states its concern for non-
investigation of the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in pre-trial detention in 2009 and non-
application of the justice to the perpetrators in Russia (Council of the EU b).  
 
Regarding the pluralistic system of organization, the EU merely expresses the promoting of 
NGOs as an objective without referring to any specified actions. When it comes to the 
political parties and transparency and accountability in public administration, the EU’s 
                                                             
6 Council Common Position 2006/276/CFSP of 10 April 2006 concerning restrictive measures against officials 
of Belarus and repealing Common Position 2004/661/CFSP. 
7
 Council Conclusions on Belarus: 3065th Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 31 January 2011. 
 
46 
 
policies do not prioritize any support to political parties but prioritizes the promotion of the 
latter in Ukraine and Russia (Appendix 3). 
 
Furthermore, murders of the journalists and the lack of freedom of media indicate two 
significant deficiencies of Belarus and Russia. As mentioned above, the lack of progress in 
the freedom of media is one of the reasons of the restrictive measures on Belarus and it is one 
of the criteria against which Belarus’ democratization progress is assessed. However, 
regarding Russia, the strategy paper does not focus on the necessity of development in this 
field. The papers on Ukraine do not refer to freedom of media.  
 
Freedom of expression is another field in relation to which Belarus’ progress is assessed 
influencing the EU’s decision on the restrictive measures. There is also limited freedom of 
expression in Russia and this issue is not raised for Ukraine. The EU raises its concern for the 
human rights situation throughout Russia in general. However, it is not included among the 
objectives of Common Spaces or the EU’s policies. 
 
5.2.2 Assessment of the Results 
In the beginning of 2000s, the EU actively responds the deficiencies of the countries in terms 
of human rights and democracy values but sometimes self-interests take precedence in this 
active promotion. For instance, promotion of independence of judiciary and the rule of law 
are associated with both the EU’s normative values and interests (a predictable investment 
climate), and in this period there are also other norms such as pluralistic system of 
organizations, free, independent and pluralistic media which are supported actively through 
different projects, partnerships and programs mainly with normative motivations. However, 
not all norms are equally focused on by the EU in both time periods. In the recent period, the 
weaknesses of Russia and Ukraine regarding human rights are emphasized by the strategy 
papers but unlike the previous period the papers do not refer to the projects and programs to 
promote pluralistic system of organizations, free, independent and pluralistic media. 
However, the EU’s actions/policies continues to prioritize the promotion of the judiciary, the 
rule of law and additionally transparency and accountability in public administration that are 
associated with the Union’s normative motivations and also the promotion of investment 
climate to a certain extent. This presents that the EU acts relatively strategically in the passive 
period. Furthermore, in Ukraine and Russia, violations of the rights are observed as similar to 
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Belarus. However, differently from Ukraine and Russia, the violations of the rights coexist in 
Belarus where the restrictive measures are mainly used in response to the violations in the 
field of rule of law, free elections and freedom of assembly.  
Particularly regarding the promotion of independent and efficient judiciary in the countries 
analyzed, the EU’s different points of motivation come to the fore in the active period. The 
main motivation to promote judicial system is the creation of a predictable investment climate 
in Russia, whereas for Ukraine it is mainly the elimination of security concerns but also the 
promotion of democracy and market economy; and for Belarus it is mainly human rights, civil 
liberties and organized crime. This may be evaluated as the role of the EU’s economic 
interests and security concerns on its understanding of norms, here independence of judiciary. 
Therefore, it is seen that time to time the EU’s interests come to the fore in promoting this 
norm. 
In the first half of the 2000s, concerns regarding the rule of law, free elections, freedom of 
assembly and violations of these rights become the main reasons of restrictive measures 
against Belarus. In the latter time period, the EU refers to the lack of significant and 
irreversible progress in certain areas of democratization as the main reason for the use of 
sanctions and starts to use the sanctions for progress. Seeing the lack of progress, the EU sets 
its democratization criteria to assess the progress achieved and these are independence of 
judiciary and the rule of law (politically-motivated imprisons), free elections, freedom of 
expression, freedom of media, freedom of assembly and political association. The EU, at the 
same time, pursues critical engagement policy with Belarus and initiates political dialogues in 
order to make the process mutual. Among the abovementioned norms, the failure to conduct 
free elections on its own does not seem to be a reason for the use of restrictive measures by 
the EU because, as seen in the above cases, the EU reacts when failure to conduct free 
elections is generally followed by the suppression of peaceful demonstrations (freedom of 
assembly). Furthermore, the restrictive measures are generally applied in the form of asset 
freeze and visa ban which show that the EU keeps an eye on punishing only those responsible 
for the violations by applying such targeted restrictive measures. The EU uses its restrictive 
measures to promote democratization process and to uphold respect for human rights and 
democratic values and against violations of the rights in the case of Belarus which can be 
evaluated as a reflection of the EU’s influence and leverage over Belarus. 
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Regarding the conflict between Russia and Chechnya, in the active period the EU emphasizes 
its concern for human rights violations, at the same time states its concern regarding the 
negative consequences of the conflict for stability of Russia’s reform process. However, in the 
recent period, the EU perceives the conflict as a threat to its own security and to regional 
stability and prioritizes these concerns over the human rights violations. 
 
Furthermore, as the materials present the promotion of the security as one of the stated 
motivating factors for the use of sanctions, and although the EU expresses its perception of 
threat with regards to the spreading instability due to the conflict between Russia and 
Chechnya, it does not pose a critique. Because it is clearly stated “as Russia becomes more 
assertive, the EU must rely on Russian goodwill, (…) for its efforts to promote a ring of stable 
and prosperous states to its east, based on democracy and respect for human rights” (CSP e: 
8). This shows the relational perception of the EU’s power/capabilities vis-à-vis Russia and 
relative weakness of the EU’s leverage over Russia.  
 
The EU has an influence/leverage over both Belarus and Ukraine (table 2), but the Union uses 
the restrictive measures against Belarus and not against Ukraine. It seems, in the case of 
Belarus, the EU perceives the violations of human rights and democracy norms as a threat or 
serious enough to trigger the restrictive measures because there are generally violations of the 
rights more than one. Violations of human rights and democracy norms are also characterized 
with Belarus’ identity. For Ukraine, considering the EU’s use of restrictive measures 
generally in the case of coexistence of violations of a few rights, it seems the EU sees 
sufficient to state the Union’s expectations from Ukraine; use programs, EC assistance, and 
not to impose sanctions for the violation of the rule of law (active period) and independence 
of judiciary (passive period) in Ukraine. 
 
By looking at the question of to what extent the EU’s use and non-use of sanctions against 
certain countries are motivated in line with normative causes or strategic interests and in 
accordance with the abovementioned results, the EU’s use of sanctions vis-à-vis Belarus is 
mainly motivated with normative causes; the EU’s non-use of sanctions against Ukraine arise 
from normative causes; and the non-use of sanctions against Russia is predominantly due to 
strategic reasons. 
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The EU’s active support of Russia and Ukraine through workshops, projects with NGOs in 
the active period and its use of restrictive measures against Belarus seem to have similar 
consequences. As similar to Belarus, the weaknesses of Russia and Ukraine in the field of 
human rights and democracy norms continue to be present over time. In response to the lack 
of progress in Belarus, the EU specifies its explicit demand from Belarus by defining the 
democratization criteria. For Ukraine and Russia the EU acts relatively strategically and 
narrows down its focus generally on the weaknesses of the norms that also concerns the 
investment climate. 
Norms form the basis of stated motivations, and it is expected that stated motivations would 
conform to actual motivations and reflect on actual practices. However, here the perception of 
threat by undertaking an intermediary role influences actual practices, accordingly actual 
motivations. When the perception of threat is high, the norms such as freedom of expression, 
the rule of law forming the basis of stated motivations give way to motivations such as 
stability and security. It is expressible that when the perception of threat is low, the EU acts in 
accordance with normative causes, and in the case of high perception of threat and low 
capability, the EU acts relatively strategically. Thus, it seems the perception of threat and the 
EU’s capabilities are influential on actual motivations.  
 
5.3. Assessment of the Hypotheses 
When the results are applied to the variables (Appendix 4), it is seen both neo-realism and 
normative theory have an explanatory power for understanding of norms, policies/actions and 
perception of threat while stated motivation is explained with normative theory. The 
understanding of norms and policies/actions change in line with the developments and for the 
promotion of norms in the active period, supporting normative theory while in the passive 
period the understanding of norms and actions/policies are shaped relatively strategically, 
conforming to neo-realist understanding. Strategic interests and maintenance of security are 
the main factors influencing EU perception of threat regarding Russia. Belarus with different 
identity is perceived as a threat to EU normative values, yet the violations of the rights in 
Ukraine seems not serious enough or as a threat, explaining the variation in application of EU 
sanctions.   
 
Consequently and returning to the hypotheses, it may be indicated that both hypotheses 
explain the EU’s use of restrictive measures to some extent. One hypothesis was: If the EU 
acts strategically we would see variations in the use of sanctions depending on the strategic 
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interests (economic and security interests) and capabilities of the Union. As the analysis of 
the materials presents, the Union emphasizes on the importance of regional stability and its 
own security more than human rights violations in the case of Russia, and the Union’s 
leverage/capabilities over other countries has an influence on its behaviors and decisions, 
which leads to the variation in the use of restrictive measures. As this is the situation, the EU 
as a potential sender seems not eager to pay higher costs by imposing the restrictive measures 
on Russia. Therefore, the EU’s use of restrictive measures varies depending on the Union’s 
capabilities which are also associated with the EU’s strategic interests (security part), leading 
the EU to act strategically towards Russia.  
 
The second hypothesis also explains the EU’s behavior in its external relations; if the EU acts 
with normative motivations, we would see variations in the use of sanctions depending on the 
state of human rights and democracy in the specific third state. In Belarus, human rights 
violations are seen more than one field persistently, and the coexistence of violations seems to 
be perceived as posing serious threat to the EU’s normative values and was reacted with a 
series of restrictive measures. In Ukraine, there is continuing deficiencies in the area of 
human rights and democracy, yet violations of the rights are observed from time to time that 
seems as not being thought as causing a variation in the identity of third country and seems as 
not being perceived serious enough to use the sanctions. Therefore, the EU’s use of restrictive 
measures can also be explained in accordance with the state of human rights and democracy 
in the specific third state - Ukraine and Belarus.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
As not seen in the literature before, the EU’s motivations regarding the use and non-use of 
sanctions and other reactions have been analyzed in-depth by using EU official documents. 
The study has also been limited to three case-countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) to be able 
to make an in-depth research. This study has been conducted within the theoretical framework 
of neo-realism and social-constructivism/normative theory. The objective was to understand 
to what extent the EU’s behaviors, reactions, especially the use of sanctions, against the third 
countries vary in accordance with strategic or normative motivations. For this purpose, the 
perspective was set to understand the EU’s stated motivations and whether they match with 
their actual motivations. 
 
By looking at the understanding of norms, actions/policies proposed to be used before 
imposing sanctions and in accordance with derived categories -stated objectives/reasons of the 
EU for using sanctions, self-definition of the EU’s own capabilities, stated motivations have 
been found normative. It is seen that sanctions are perceived negative; there is an emphasis on 
the significance of dialogue before the use of sanctions; serious human rights violations are 
seen as main reason for using the sanctions; freedom of expression, association and assembly, 
the rule of law, access to justice and the right to fair trial are particularly underlined regarding 
the norms; the EU’s capabilities are indicated as serving to promote the Union’s normative 
values globally. 
Considering the differentiation in the EU’s actions/policies against the case-countries, the 
time period analyzed has been divided into two as “active” and “passive”. In the active period 
the EU’s focus on norms changes in accordance with the developments, and its 
actions/policies are taken properly and change for the promotion of norms. However, it is 
seen that the weaknesses in the field of human rights/democracy in all case-countries continue 
to be present over time. In the passive period, the EU’s actions/policies and focus on norms 
are shaped relatively strategically as the EU focuses more on the weaknesses of certain norms 
associated also with the Union’s interests and remains passive in addressing continuing 
weaknesses of other norms such as pluralistic system of organizations, free, independent and 
pluralistic media in Ukraine and Russia. Against Belarus the EU continues to impose 
sanctions, yet by defining its democratization criteria. Thus, it seems over time the EU’s 
behaviors/reactions vary according to the consequences of the Union’s actions/policies.  
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Disrespect to normative values and violations of the rights time to time in Ukraine seems to 
be significant concerns for the EU but seems not strong enough to be perceived as a threat to 
trigger the restrictive measures. For Belarus, the EU perceives the violations of human rights 
as a threat to the Union’s normative values; for Russia, the EU’s own security and regional 
stability seems depending on Russia’s capabilities, leading the variation in the use of 
sanctions by the EU. Hence, neo-realism explains the EU’s behavior vis-à-vis Russia while 
normative theory has more explanatory power regarding the EU’s behavior vis-à-vis Ukraine 
and Belarus. Yet this study does not set a clear relationship between the use/non-use of 
sanctions and economic interests. In the study of Hazelzet (2001), it is indicated that EU 
economic interests and similarly security interests did not prevent the Union to react human 
rights violations via sanctions between 1989 and 2000.  
 
The EU’s stated motivations regarding sanctions and other reactions are normative. The 
results reached through in-depth analysis of three countries regarding the EU’s actual 
motivations indicates that perception of threat and the EU’s relative capability have an 
intermediary role of influencing EU sanctions and actions/policies. This result is believed to 
contribute in the literature regarding understanding the EU’s future actions/policies and 
motivations. 
 
In the case of normative power EU, the points taken into consideration are power of EU ideas 
and the ability of the EU to set international norms and diffuse them, and it is seen that 
normative motivations form the basis of EU restrictive measures, actions and policies. 
According to the results of this study, it can be said that the EU may use this “power” in 
proportion to its relative capability. 
The literature review presents four possible different points of motivations -ideational 
commitment, empathy, altruism, self-interest- for promoting norms, and in order to find with 
which of these motivations the EU directs its sanctions, a possible research may be done by 
taking only the countries subjected to EU sanctions. 
Furthermore, this thesis has been limited to the information expressed by the EU’s official 
documents. That’s why a future research may gather the information in different ways such as 
the structured interviews with the relevant officers in EU institutions. The analysis of this time 
period with different research techniques, the use of more documents and the examination of 
more case-countries are also suggested.  
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Appendix 1: Content Analysis - Categories derived from the Examination 
of the Communications  
 COM 2001/252 COM 2006/421 COM 2011/886 
Stated 
objectives/reasons of 
the EU for using 
sanctions 
 
To promote human rights 
and democratization 
process 
 
Motivation for using 
sanctions is ‘progress’ 
and ‘change’  
 
Sanctions support the 
process of democratic 
governance. 
Sanctions when 
necessary 
In serious cases 
Because of human 
rights violations 
EU perspectives 
regarding sanctions 
Negative approach 
 
‘Sanctions’ and ‘negative 
measures’ are used 
interchangeably. 
Shift the unilateral 
process of sanctioning 
into a mutual process 
The EU tends to use 
sanctions less than 
dialogue. 
 
Actions/policies 
proposed to be used 
before imposing 
sanctions 
Dialogue, consultation, 
capacity-building 
measures, incentives 
EIDHR and Tacis as well 
as Partnership and Co-
operation Agreements 
(PCA) 
Exchanging views to 
decide most effective 
measures/actions/policies 
for human rights. 
 
Political dialogue, 
development aid 
programming 
 
Preventive dimension 
of dialogue 
Human rights 
dialogues and 
consultations, political 
meetings, diplomatic 
demarches 
 
 
Understanding of 
human rights and 
democracy 
Human rights are 
universal and indivisible 
Democracy: 
“functioning” and 
“participatory” - 
governments should be 
“accountable, democratic 
and pluralist”. 
“Such governments 
[Corrupt and autocratic] 
also generate conflict 
and instability in their 
region. Democratic, 
pluralist governments 
which respect the rights 
of minorities are less 
likely to resort to 
nationalism, violence or 
aggression, either 
“Development, human 
rights, peace and 
security are indivisible 
and mutually 
reinforcing” (COM 
2006/421: 3). 
Democratic 
governance refers to 
“respect of human 
rights and fundamental 
freedoms; support for 
democratization 
processes; human 
security; management 
of migration flows; 
sustainable 
management of natural 
and energy resources 
and of the 
environment; the 
Cultural differences 
cannot be excuse for 
human rights 
violations 
Emphasis on ‘serious’ 
human rights 
violations 
Essential elements for 
human rights and 
democracy: ‘Freedoms 
of expression, 
association and 
assembly’ 
 
The rule of law, 
including access to 
justice and the right to 
fair trial: protector of 
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internally, against their 
neighbors or further 
afield”(COM 2001: 4) 
promotion of 
sustainable economic 
growth […]” (COM 
2006/421) 
 
Poor governance leads 
to human rights 
violations. 
democratic principles 
and human rights. 
 
Protection and 
promotion of 
“freedom, dignity, 
equality and justice for 
all” are key foreign 
policy priorities.  
 
The promotion of 
human rights and 
democracy enhance 
“security, 
development, 
economic participation 
and social inclusion” 
and reinforce 
international peace, 
stability, and 
prosperity. 
Deep democracy: 
“setting a baseline of 
necessary 
accomplishments 
against which progress 
can be assessed” 
Self-definition of the 
EU’s own capabilities 
Substantial political and 
moral weight, economic 
and political player. 
The EU’s influence and 
leverage used for the 
promotion of human 
rights and democracy. 
 The EU as a global 
force for human rights. 
Sources: COM 2001/252; COM 2006/421; COM 2011/886. 
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Appendix 2: Content Analysis – Case Countries (2002-2006) 
Democracy-
Human Rights 
Elements & 
Perception of 
threat 
Belarus 
2002-2006 
Russia 
2002-2006 
Ukraine 
2002-2006 
Perception of 
threats 
(security, 
stability, trade, 
economy) 
Weak 
Increasing migration 
movements, legal and 
illegal (CSP a: 14) 
 
Belarus “claims credit for 
its efforts to halt illegal 
migration on its territory, 
which would otherwise 
infiltrate the EU” (CSP a: 
7) 
 
“The transition towards a 
market economy is less 
advanced in Belarus than in 
almost all CIS countries” 
(CSP a:12) 
 
“Belarus’ trade pattern has 
little evolved since 
independence, in terms of 
trade partners as well as the 
commodity structure of 
import and export” (CSP a: 
13) 
 
EU response: 
Finalization of border 
demarcation on the borders 
with Lithuania and Latvia 
is priority. Tacis assistance 
to this end ( CSP a: 14). 
 
Cross-border cooperation 
strategy (CSP a: 94). 
 
EU program for financial 
and technical assistance to 
third countries in the area 
of migration and asylum – 
applies to Belarus as well 
(CSP a). 
 
 
Strong 
“Soft” security threats from 
Russia: nuclear safety, the 
fight against crime, 
including drug trafficking, 
illegal immigration, the 
spread of diseases, 
environmental pollution. 
 
“Should Russia go in a 
more authoritarian 
direction, e.g. with regard 
to media freedom, and 
should it not achieve a deep 
reform of its judiciary and 
public administration, this 
would threaten the 
investment climate and 
economic development and 
make deeper partnership 
with the EU and other 
western partners more 
difficult” (CSP b: 10) 
 
Dependence on energy 
supplies from Russia; 
"The EU has a key interest 
in maintaining and 
enhancing Russia’s role as 
a secure and reliable 
supplier of natural gas and 
oil on favorable conditions 
to the EU market" (CSP b: 
4) 
 
“Our trade relationship with 
Russia is very significant, 
given Russia’s huge market 
size and natural resources” 
(CSP b) 
 
“Due to its size and 
location, Russia is a key 
actor for the stability and 
security of the entire 
European continent” (CSP 
b) 
 
Medium/Weak 
 With enlargement, more 
sensitive to “soft” security 
threats- environment 
(following up to the closure of 
Chernobyl, nuclear safety, 
climate change), justice and 
home affairs (judicial reform 
and combating organized 
crime, corruption, illegal 
immigration), public health 
(transmissible diseases) (CSP 
c) 
 
“While trade flows with 
Ukraine remain limited, there 
is potential for an increase, 
considering the size of its 50-
million inhabitant market, its 
geographical proximity and its 
links with future EU 
members” (CSP c: 1) 
 
EU response: 
Border control. Focus on the 
improvement of Ukraine’s 
capacity to manage its borders 
(CSP c: 19) 
 
“energy policy reform will 
remain essential for Ukraine’s 
economic and political future, 
(…) and for safe and efficient 
transit of energy to the EU, 
and should remain a priority 
for EC-Ukraine co-operation” 
(CSP c: 15) 
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EU response: 
Particular attention paid to 
strategic energy sector 
through EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue (CSP b) 
 
“EU-Russia relations over 
the last decade have been 
shaped by the EU’s interest 
in developing liberalized 
trade and investment 
relations, (…) founded on 
the core principles of 
democracy, respect for 
human rights and rule of 
law” (CSP b) 
right to life, right 
to liberty and 
security 
Positive: trafficking in 
persons, the smuggling of 
migrants, insufficient 
protection of victims and 
witnesses (CSP a: 14) 
 
New legislation & 
governmental actions has 
been adopted (CSP a) 
 
Negative: Weak protection 
of asylum seekers and 
refugees, stateless persons. 
But a new (third) version of 
the Law of the Republic of 
Belarus on Refugees 
entered into force in 2003. 
(CSP a: 14) 
 
EU response: 
Regional dialogue, 
information & experience 
exchange  - i.e. 
Söderköping process. (CSP 
a: 14) 
Negative: Basic individual 
rights are often not 
adequately protected. (CSP 
b: 9) 
 
 
 
right to fair trial    
right to respect 
for private and 
family life 
   
right to effective 
remedy 
   
prohibition of 
torture 
   
prohibition of 
discrimination 
Positive: policy for 
ensuring equality, 
elimination of 
discrimination against 
women (CSP a: 9) 
  
prohibition of    
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slavery and 
forced labor 
freedom of 
movement 
 The movement of goods 
and people - The 
Commission 
Communication on 
Kaliningrad on January 
2001(CSP b) 
 
abolition to 
death penalty 
   
right to appeal in 
criminal matters 
Negative: Mistreatment of 
detainees and prisoners, 
detention officials suppress 
suspects’ appeals. (CSP a: 
15) 
 
EU response: Detention 
personnel would benefit 
from appropriate training 
(CSP a) 
  
freedom of 
expression 
Negative: the lack of 
freedom of expression 
(CSP a) 
 
EU response: 
Strong concern - In 2002-
04 the EU has several times 
drawn attention in public to 
the lack of freedom of 
expression (CSP a) 
 
Negative: Reported attacks 
and intimidation of 
journalists- leads to self-
censorship (CSP b: 7) 
 
EU response: Worrying 
development (CSP b: 7) 
 
freedom of 
thought, 
conscience and 
religion 
 Positive: Established 
freedom of opinion (CSP b) 
 
freedom of 
assembly and 
association 
Negative: 2006- systemic, 
serious violation of core 
trade union rights of 
ILO
8
/labour rights 
(European Commission b) 
 
EU response: 
December 2006 temporary 
withdrawal of EU GSP
9
 
from Belarus (European 
Commission b) 
 
  
free elections Negative: 2001 presidential 
elections, 2003 local 
elections failed to meet 
Positive: Democratically 
elected President and 
Parliament (CSP b) 
Positive: Ukraine’s President 
and Parliament are 
democratically elected. 
                                                             
8 The International Labour Organisations of which Belarus is a member. 
9 The EU Generalised System of Preferences  
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international democratic 
standards/ OSCE
10
 
commitments (CSP a: 4,6) 
 
Negative: “The 
parliamentary elections and 
referendum in Belarus on 
17 October 2004 fell 
significantly short of 
Belarus' basic OSCE 
commitments.”  
(2004/848/CFSP) 
 
Negative: Peaceful 
demonstrations were 
suppressed causing “severe 
human rights violations” 
(2004/848/CFSP) 
 
EU response: 
Restrictive measures 
against certain officials of 
Belarus were expanded to 
some other Belarusian 
authorities 
(2004/848/CFSP) 
Parliamentary elections are 
due in March 2002 (CSP c). 
a pluralistic 
system of 
political parties 
and 
organizations 
Negative: Authoritarian 
system of power, 
introduced by President 
Lukashenko in 1996/7 
(CSP a) 
 
Negative: “There are 
eighteen registered political 
parties, but a multiparty 
parliamentary system is not 
developed. The political 
opposition is currently 
almost absent in the 
national assembly.” (CSP a: 
6) 
 
Negative: the lack of 
freedom of religious 
organizations, systemic 
repression of NGOs, higher 
education institutions (CSP 
a) 
 
EU response: In 2002-04 
the EU has several times 
drawn attention in public, 
Positive: “Some 
fundamentals of a real 
democracy, such as wide 
acceptance of political 
pluralism (…), have been 
established.” (CSP b) 
 
Negative: “But autocratic 
tendencies are still strong” 
(CSP b: 9) 
 
Negative: “A new law on 
political parties is likely to 
lead to a drastic reduction 
in the number of political 
Parties” (CSP b) 
 
“It may lead to the 
emergence of a three-party 
system: the Communists, 
the pro-presidential factions 
and liberals (possible 
merger between the “Union 
of Rightist Forces” and 
“Yabloko”) (CSP b) 
 
Positive: “While public 
opinion, civil society and more 
consolidated political parties 
are emerging, the direction of 
change will depend much on 
the conduct of the next 
parliamentary elections and the 
political battle for the 
succession of President 
Kuchma.” (CSP c: 10) 
 
EU Response: Tacis-funded 
LIEN (Linking Inter-European 
NGOs), partnership with 
NGOs, EIDHR – to support 
civil society, NGOs (CSP c). 
 
Critique - more active role of 
civil society needed for pol. 
development (CSP c: 6) 
                                                             
10 OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) monitors elections in accordance with the 
international democratic standards. 
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strong concern, greater 
financial support to NGOs 
(CSP a) 
 
Negative: no democratic 
progress;  in 2002 closure 
of OSCE AMG
11
 office in 
Minsk (CSP a) 
 
EU response: 14 out of 15 
EU MS applied visa ban 
against President 
Lukashenko & 7 political 
leaders (CSP a) 
 
Positive: 2003, 
establishment of  new 
OSCE office (CSP a) 
 
EU response: visa ban 
lifted (CSP a) 
Centralization of power & 
weakening of opposition  
caused serious concerns 
about human rights (CSP b) 
 
Traditionally weak civil 
society (CSP b) 
 
Development of civil 
society -considered a major 
objective to consolidate 
democracy, the rule of law, 
media freedom, social 
safety (CSP b: 4) 
 
Response: Actions taken 
through EIDHR & Tacis to 
promote partnerships with 
NGOs on social welfare 
and to develop civil society 
(CSP b: 11,17) 
 
Rule of law Negative: Impunity for 
persons responsible for 
killing or injuring 
individuals; no full 
investigation of four 
prominent people’s 
disappearances
12
 (CSP a: 
8,15) 
 
EU response: 
restrictive measures; visa 
ban, freezing of assets 
(2004/661/CFSP) 
 
 
Positive: Since 1991 
progress in governance of 
market economy with rule 
of law (CSP b: 9) 
 
Negative: Conflict affects 
the rule of law in Chechnya 
(CSP b: 4) 
 
EU response: 
 “The EU supports political 
solution of conflict and 
restoring the rule of law in 
Chechnya” (CSP b: 4) 
 
Projects with NGOs, CoE, 
OHCHR to assist victims of 
human rights violations in 
the northern Caucasus (CSP 
b) 
 
Conflict in Chechnya is 
seen challenge for stability 
of reform process: “Even 
with steady economic 
development, Russia needs 
to address deep social 
Negative: No respect for rule 
of law (CSP c). 
 
“Problems of corruption and 
human rights infringements 
continue to remain a feature of 
Ukrainian reality. This has 
allowed for the rise of so-
called “oligarchs”, or political-
financial groups gaining power 
and wealth through their 
connections to the authorities. 
It has also allowed for serious 
human rights violations. 
Examples of this include 
several unresolved murders of 
journalists” (CSP c: 5,6) 
 
EU response: 
Requirement: “Ukraine needs 
to (…) respect for the rule of 
law” (CSP c: 10) 
 
EIDHR-strengthening the rule 
of law (CSP c) 
  
                                                             
11 OSCE Assistance and Monitoring Group (AMG) 
12 This case may also be analyzed within the framework of the independence of judiciary. The two norms are 
closely associated, as stated in the strategy paper for Belarus: “An independent judiciary is also a prerequisite to 
ensure the rule of law and respect for human rights and civil liberties, as well as to effectively combat crime.” 
(CSP a: 15) 
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problems, which could 
threaten the stability of the 
reform process (…). 
Another challenge is the 
ethnic problem, embodied 
first and foremost by the 
conflict in Chechnya, 
which urgently needs a 
peaceful, political solution” 
(CSP b: 10,11) 
transparency 
and 
accountability in 
public 
administration 
 Negative: Weak level of 
trust in public institutions 
(CSP b) 
 
Negative: Public 
administration often lacks 
transparency and efficiency 
(CSP b: 9) 
 
Positive: A law under 
preparation to lay down 
foundations for a genuine 
anti-corruption policy (CSP 
b: 9) 
Negative: Weak political 
accountability due to fragile 
civil society (CSP c: 5) 
 
Negative: Corruption (CSP c) 
 
EU response: 
EIDHR supporting 
administrative accountability 
(CSP c) 
 
Combat corruption-EIDHR 
(CSP c) 
right to take part 
in conduct of 
public affairs 
- 
 
EU response: 
In 2000-03, CSDP (Civil 
Society Development 
Program) has encouraged 
people to take an active part 
in the development of civil 
society, democracy. (CSP 
a: 17) 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive: “There are signs of 
the emergence of a more 
structured political debate, 
with public opinion and media 
playing a more assertive role 
in the determination of 
Ukraine’s political agenda.” 
(CSP c: 6)  
 
Negative: Public opinion has 
had little influence on policy-
making, and politics remain 
largely the concern of a small 
"elite" (CSP c: 10).  
 
EU response: 
“Ukraine needs to foster a 
more open and structured 
political debate, with public 
opinion playing a greater role 
in the determination of 
Ukraine’s political agenda” 
(CSP c: 10) 
separation of 
powers and 
independence of 
the judiciary 
Negative: Authoritarian 
system of power: the 
replacement of the 
democratically elected  
Parliament with a national 
assembly nominated by the 
President in 1997 (CSP a) 
 
Positive: Democratically 
elected Presidents and 
Parliament (Presidential 
democracy) (CSP b) 
 
Negative: Weak level of 
trust in judicial system –
Despite past Tacis 
Negative: “The issue of the 
division of power between the 
President, Parliament and 
Government, make the 
prospects for further 
democratic and economic 
reform uncertain” (CSP c: 10) 
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Negative: “Although the 
independence of the 
judiciary is ensured in the 
constitution, actual practice 
is often different” (CSP a) 
 
EU response: 
“An independent judiciary 
is a prerequisite to ensure 
the rule of law and respect 
for human rights and civil 
liberties, as well as to 
effectively combat crime” 
(CSP a) 
 
 
initiatives, judiciary is the 
weakest pillar of power. 
(CSP b: 11) 
 
Negative: The judicial 
system cannot be 
considered completely 
independent from other 
branches of power (CSP b: 
9)  
 
Negative: “Independence 
of the judicial system 
remains weak and curtailed 
by competing political elite 
interests.” (CSP b) 
 
EU response: 
Serious reform of judiciary 
needed for business and 
investment climate (CSP b: 
10) 
 
Projects with NGOs, 
OHCHR
13
, CoE
14
 to 
strengthen independence of 
judiciary (CSP b: 13) 
 
Negative: Limited role of 
courts (CSP c) 
 
Negative: The use of law 
enforcement authorities 
against political enemies (CSP 
c: 6) 
 
Positive: The judicial reform 
agenda encompasses a 
complete overhaul of the pre-
trial and court system (CSP c) 
 
Negative: The judiciary is the 
weakest pillar of power, 
curtailed by competing 
political elite interests (CSP c: 
10) 
 
EU response: 
Support for institutional, legal 
and administrative reform- 
Tacis (CSP c) 
 
EIDHR- independence of 
judiciary (CSP c) 
free, 
independent and 
pluralistic media 
Negative: In 2002-04, no 
freedom of media, systemic 
pressure on independent 
media outlets (CSP a) 
 
Harassment of critical 
intellectuals and journalists 
(CSP a: 7,8) 
 
Closures of independent 
media outlets (CSP a: 8) 
 
EU response: 
Strong concern, greater 
financial support to NGOs 
working to strengthen 
independent media (CSP a) 
Negative: There is media 
pluralism but media 
independence is weak -
powerful media empires 
control all media outlets 
(CSP b) 
 
The state-owned media has 
a strong position, and state 
authorities maintain some 
leverage over formally 
independent media, 
especially in the regions 
(CSP b). 
 
 
EU response: 
Concern about media 
independence, possible 
political intolerance (CSP 
b) 
 
Projects with NGOs, CoE, 
OHCHR to promote 
Negative: Weak press freedom 
(CSP c: 10) 
 
EU response: 
Promotion of independent and 
responsible media and free 
press - through EIDHR (CSP 
c) 
                                                             
13 OHCHR: The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
14 CoE: Council of Europe 
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independent media (CSP b: 
13) 
Sources: Country Strategy Paper (CSP) a, b, c; 2004/848/CFSP. 
 
Appendix 3: Content Analysis – Case Countries (2007-2013) 
Democracy-
Human Rights 
Elements & 
Perception of 
threat 
Belarus  
2007-2013 
Russia    
2007-2013 
Ukraine  
2007-2013 
Perception of 
threat (security, 
stability, trade, 
economy) 
 Strong 
“The main interests of the 
EU in Russia lie in fostering 
the political and economic 
stability of the Federation; in 
maintaining a stable supply 
of energy; in further co-
operation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs, the 
environment and nuclear 
safety in order to combat 
‘soft’ security threats; and in 
stepping up cooperation with 
Russia in the Southern 
Caucasus and the Western 
NIS for the geopolitical 
stability of the CIS region, 
including for the resolution 
of frozen conflicts.” (CSP e: 
3) 
 
“If the regions adjacent to 
Russia are not stable, this 
will have consequences for 
the security of the EU itself.” 
(CSP e: 5) 
 
“Progress towards achieving 
the Common Spaces is 
vulnerable to security threats.  
The conflict in Chechnya has 
provoked widespread 
humanitarian problems, and 
the continuing crisis has 
threatened to tip the wider 
Northern Caucasus into 
disarray and conflict. The 
EU is thus concerned to 
support the stabilization, 
recovery and ultimately the 
development of the North 
Caucasus.” (CSP e: 3) 
Strong 
“Ukraine is a key strategic 
partner for the EU in order 
to secure and diversify 
energy supplies. Ukraine is 
a key transit country for oil 
and gas supplies, with 40% 
of the EU’s natural gas 
imports crossing the 
Ukraine network” (CSP f: 
28) 
 
EU response: “The EU and 
Ukraine are (…) 
considerably stepping up 
their cooperation in the 
field of energy” (CSP f: 28) 
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EC response:  
EC financial cooperation 
(CSP e: 5) 
 
“As Russia becomes more 
assertive, the EU must rely 
on Russian goodwill, (…) for 
its efforts to promote a ring 
of stable and prosperous 
states to its east, based on 
democracy and respect for 
human rights” (CSP e: 8) 
 
“The Energy Dialogue is 
intended to ensure energy 
security and price stability 
for both the EU and Russia” 
(CSP e: 22) 
 
right to life, right 
to liberty and 
security 
Negative: “Providing 
protection to asylum seekers 
and refugees as well as 
stateless persons remains 
weak” (CSP d: 13) 
Negative: “Russian 
legislation implementing the 
UN Convention relating to 
the status of refugees permits 
an asylum-seeker only 24 
hours in which to make a 
claim. Asylum-seekers are 
not given papers entitling 
them to stay in Russia while 
awaiting a decision on their 
claim, making them 
vulnerable to removal as 
illegal immigrants. During 
that period – which can last 
for 1-2 years – the applicant 
has no other legal rights and 
is not entitled to work or 
receive state medical 
assistance. State facilities for 
asylum seekers are minimal” 
(CSP e: 9, 10) 
 
EU response: exchange 
information on migration 
management policies, etc. 
(CSP e: 39) 
 
right to fair trial   Negative: No respect for 
international standards of 
fair trials (Council of the 
EU c) 
 
Response: Strong concern 
(Council of the EU c) 
right to respect for 
private and family 
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life 
right to effective 
remedy 
   
prohibition of 
torture 
Negative: “Torture is 
reported to be used routinely 
to extract  
confessions from 
detainees”(CSP d: 9) 
 
Belarus is a party to the 
Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, but it has not 
ratified the European 
Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture. (CSP 
d: 9) 
Negative: Regarding the case 
of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky's 
death in pre-trial detention: 
“Two independent 
investigations, conducted by 
the Public Oversight 
Commission for Human 
Rights Observance in 
Moscow Detention Centers 
and by the Russian 
Presidential Council on the  
Development of Civil 
Society and Human Rights, 
revealed that Sergey 
Magnitsky was subjected to 
inhumane conditions, 
deliberate neglect and 
torture.” (Council of the EU 
b) 
 
prohibition of 
discrimination 
   
prohibition of 
slavery and forced 
labor 
   
freedom of 
movement 
 EU response: The 
facilitation of the movement 
of persons/readmission 
through the Common Space 
of Justice, Freedom and 
Security (CSP e: 39). 
 
abolition to death 
penalty 
Negative: Belarus 
implements the death penalty 
(CSP d: 9) 
 
EU response:“The EU called 
on the authorities to declare 
an immediate moratorium on 
the use of the death penalty, 
with a view to its abolition.” 
(European Commission a: 8) 
  
right to appeal in 
criminal matters 
   
freedom of 
expression 
Negative: “Freedom of 
expression and of the press 
deteriorated further” (CSP 
d:10) 
Negative: “freedom of 
expression is tolerated only 
within limits” (CSP e: 30)  
 
freedom of 
thought, 
conscience and 
religion 
   
freedom of Negative: Following the   
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assembly and 
association 
March 2006 Belarusian 
presidential elections, the 
demonstrators and the 
members of opposition were 
suppressed by use of 
violence and arrested (CSP d: 
8) 
 
EU response: 10
th
 April 
2006 restrictive measures 
(see also ‘free elections’ 
section).  
 
March 2006, “the EU 
expresses its concern over 
the systematic infringements 
on fundamental rights and 
freedoms, such as the rights 
of assembly, association” 
(CSP d: 10) 
 
“The EU has repeatedly  
expressed its disappointment 
with the deterioration in the 
freedom of assembly and 
association” (European 
Commission a) 
 
Negative: The events after 
the Presidential elections of 
19 December 2010 
(European Commission a) 
 
EU response: “The EU 
decided on 31 January 2011 
to reinstate and extend 
sanctions against persons 
responsible for the electoral 
fraud that occurred and for 
the violent crackdown that 
followed” (European 
Commission a: 4) 
 
Negative: Continuing failure 
to protect core labor rights 
(CSP d: 1) 
 
EU response: withdrawal of 
GSP entered into force (21 
June 2007) 
15
 (CSP d: 1) 
a pluralistic 
system of political 
Negative: “Although civil 
society is developing in 
Negative: “Recent changes 
in the law on NGO 
Positive/Negative: “The 
attempt, during summer-
                                                             
15 “GSP withdrawal is not a sanction related to the political situation but the cancellation of a privilege over non-
implementation of core labour standards” (CSP d: 1) 
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parties and 
organizations 
Belarus, many NGOs have 
been closed down for minor 
administrative irregularities.” 
(CSP d: 10) 
 
EU Response: Support for 
democratic development 
including NGOs is a priority 
area (CSP d: 25) 
 
 
registration may further 
discourage the emergence of 
a true civil society in 
Russia.” (CSP e: 7) 
 
“The Kremlin is getting into 
the game of ‘creating’ NGOs 
to counter the influence of 
Western-funded 
organizations operating in its 
sphere of influence.” (CSP e: 
8) 
 
Negative: “The political 
opposition remains weak and 
fractious. Party political 
rivalry appears to be a mask 
for the struggle between rival 
clans for control of the 
national wealth.” (CSP e: 15) 
autumn 2006, to create a 
government of national 
unity bringing together Mr 
Yanukovych’s Party of the 
Regions and President 
Yushchenko’s “Our 
Ukraine” bloc did not 
succeed.” (CSP f: 6) 
 
EU Response: 
Development of civil 
society/NGOs is an 
objective (CSP f: 13). 
free elections Negative: An OSCE report 
on the March 2006 
Belarusian presidential 
elections referred to “serious 
violations of election 
standards”. “The European 
Union called the Presidential 
elections in Belarus 
“fundamentally flawed”” 
(CSP d: 8) 
 
The EU response: 
The 10
th 
 April 2006, the 
restrictive measures were 
adopted against President  
Lukashenko, the Belarusian 
leadership and officials 
responsible for the 
violations
16
 (CSP d: 8). (see 
‘freedom of assembly’ for 
other reasons of this 
restrictive measures)  
 
Negative: The Presidential 
elections in  
December 2010 (European 
Commission a) 
 
EU response: “The FAC of 
31 January 2011
17
 decided to 
reinstate and extend 
Negative: 4 March 2012 
Russian Presidential 
elections – several 
shortcomings such as the 
restriction of the voters’ 
choices, irregularities in the 
conduct of elections 
(MEMO/12/158). 
 
EU response: The EU 
encourages Russia to address 
these shortcomings 
(MEMO/12/158).  
 
4 December 2011 Duma 
elections – OSCE/ODIHR 
reports of procedural 
violations, such as lack of 
media impartiality, lack of 
separation between party and 
state, and the harassments of 
independent monitoring 
attempts, are however of 
serious concern (Council of 
the EU a).  
 
Expectation from the 
authorities to address these 
shortcomings (Council of the 
EU a). 
Positive: First truly free 
and fair parliamentary 
elections on 26 March 2006 
(CSP f: 6) 
 
Negative: Several 
shortcomings with the  
conduct of the 28 October 
2012 parliamentary 
elections, “a deterioration 
in several areas compared 
to standards previously 
achieved” (Council of the 
EU c) 
 
Negative: “The opposition 
leaders were prevented 
from standing in the 
parliamentary elections.” 
(Council of the EU c: 2) 
 
EU Response: The EU 
“expects the Government of 
Ukraine to implement in an 
inclusive dialogue with the 
opposition (…) to establish 
a reliable electoral system 
based on an Election Code 
and clear rules for balanced 
media access for electoral 
competitors.” & The EU 
                                                             
16 Council Common Position 2006/276/CFSP of 10 April 2006 concerning restrictive measures against officials 
of Belarus and repealing Common Position 2004/661/CFSP.  
17 Council Conclusions on Belarus: 3065th Foreign Affairs Council meeting Brussels, 31 January 2011  
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sanctions against persons 
responsible for the electoral 
fraud and for the violent 
crackdown that followed.” 
(European Commission a: 8)  
“expects Ukraine to uphold 
and promote all existing 
OSCE commitments” 
(Council of the EU c: 1,3) 
The rule of law Negative: “Some detentions 
are arbitrary”-  “In 
September 2005, the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention declared the 
detention of Mikhail 
Marinich, a former Minister, 
to be arbitrary” (CSP d: 9) 
 
Negative: “There are still 
significant challenges in 
terms of strengthening the 
rule of law” (European 
Commission a: 4) 
 
EU Response: “The EU is 
willing to deepen its 
relationship with Belarus, 
including access to the full 
benefits of the ENP, once the 
Belarusian authorities clearly 
demonstrate their willingness 
to respect democratic values 
and the rule of law.” (CSP d: 
6) 
 
In 2011 FAC Conclusions, 
the EU reiterated that 
deepening of the EU-Belarus 
relationship is “conditional 
on progress towards respect” 
by the Belarusian authorities 
for the rule of law, human 
rights and the principles of 
democracy (European 
Commission a: 8). 
Negative: “The Yukos affair 
provides the most high 
profile recent example of 
(…) its (Russia’s) clumsy 
handling demonstrating the 
selective application of the 
rule of law” (CSP e: 31) 
 
EU Response: Improvement 
of law enforcement systems 
is assessed among the 
objectives of Common 
Spaces (CSP e: 38).  
 
“Improvement of the 
legislative and law 
enforcement systems for the 
protection of intellectual, 
industrial and commercial 
property rights in order to 
enhance competitiveness and 
improving the investment 
climate” (CSP e) 
Negative: The death of 
lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in 
2009 in pre-trial detention – 
no full investigation, 
perpetrators were not brought 
to justice. (Council of the EU 
b) 
 
EU response: Statement for 
EU’s concern (Council of the 
EU b) 
Negative: often unclear 
laws and regulations, and 
uneven and arbitrary 
enforcement - makes the 
investment climate 
unpredictable  (CSP f: 7) 
 
EU response: Political 
dialogue, reform, EC 
assistance to strengthen the 
rule of law (CSP f) 
 
EU response: From 2007 
on EC assistance is 
provided to Ukraine 
through the European 
Neighborhood and 
Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) that includes the 
rule of law as a priority 
area (CSP f). 
transparency and 
accountability in 
public 
administration 
 Negative: The corruption of 
the bureaucracy  – “Russia 
ranks on a par with Albania 
on the Transparency 
International scale of 
corruption” (CSP e: 15) 
 
EU response: “The EU also 
provides support for anti-
corruption measures in 
Russia and for the reform of 
the Russian judicial system 
in general.” (CSP e: 23)  
  
Negative: Corruption, not 
fully transparent (CSP f: 8) 
 
EU response: Policy 
measures are required to 
fight against corruption, to 
improve transparency (CSP 
f: 8) 
 
Political dialogue, EC 
assistance (CSP f) 
 
“Improving the investment 
climate”: “Objectives 
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Fighting corruption is one of 
the priorities of Common 
Spaces (CSP e: 44) 
 
“While investors currently 
active in Russia are generally 
satisfied with returns, there is 
hesitation on the part of 
potential new investors. 
Corruption continues to be a 
major problem.” (CSP e: 34) 
include improving 
transparency, predictability 
and simplification of 
regulation.” (CSP f: 5) 
right to take part 
in conduct of 
public affairs 
 Negative: “Russian citizens 
in general are not sensitive to 
political or civic rights 
issues.” (CSP e: 15) 
 
separation of 
powers and 
independence of 
the judiciary 
Negative: “Although the 
Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, the 
President appoints six of the 
twelve judges of the 
Constitutional Court and all 
other judges.” (CSP d: 9) 
 
“There are credible reports of 
“telephone justice”, whereby 
judges receive telephone 
instructions from government 
officials” (CSP d: 9) 
 
EU response: Assistance to 
support reform of the 
judiciary  (CSP d: 27) 
 
Negative: The politically-
motivated criminal 
prosecution (European 
Commission a: 7) 
 
EU response: politically-
motivated criminal 
prosecution is one of the 
reasons of restrictive 
measures - the Council 
Conclusions of 17 November  
2009
18
 (European 
Commission a). 
Negative: Politically-biased 
legal system, powerful 
repressive law enforcement 
agencies, power is 
increasingly concentrated 
within the Presidential 
administration.  (CSP e: 3) 
 
Negative: No independent 
judiciary (CSP e) 
 
“Many observers express 
increasing concern about 
recent constitutional change 
and the position of the 
judiciary in particular.” (CSP 
e: 15) 
 
Negative: Constitutional 
change; i.e.  “the nomination 
by the President of regional 
governors and the ability that 
the Kremlin now has to 
dissolve regional Dumas” 
(CSP e: 31) 
 
EU Response: Contributing 
to the efficiency of the 
judicial system is one of the 
aims of the Common Spaces. 
Actions taken through 
exchange of information, 
professional training, 
workshops (CSP e: 44) 
 
 
Negative: 2012, “the 
politically motivated 
convictions of  
members of the former 
Government after trials 
which did not respect 
international standards  
as regards fair, transparent 
and independent legal 
process” (Council of the 
EU c) 
 
EU response: Strong 
concern & the Council 
expects Ukraine to take 
additional steps on judicial 
reform (Council of the EU 
c) 
 
EU response: From 2007 
on EC assistance is 
provided to Ukraine for 
judicial reform through the 
European Neighborhood 
and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) 
 
free, independent Negative: ““Reporters Negative: Lack of  
                                                             
18 Council Conclusions on Belarus 2974th External Relations Council meeting Brussels, 17 November 2009. 
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and pluralistic 
media 
Without Borders” ranks 
Belarus in152nd place out of 
167 under the press freedom 
index (2005)” (CSP d: 10) 
 
Negative: “prosecutions 
against journalists are 
common” (CSP d: 10) 
“Two investigative 
journalists have recently 
been murdered.” (CSP d: 10) 
 
EU response: During 2010 
he EU has repeatedly 
expressed its disappointment 
with the deterioration in the 
freedom of media. (European 
Commission a) 
independent media (CSP e: 
7)  
 
Negative: “The media is 
forced to exercise a prudent 
self-censorship” (CSP e: 30) 
 
Negative: Murder of 
journalist Anna 
Politkovskaya (CSP e) 
Sources: Country Strategy Paper (CSP) d, e, f; Council of the European Union a, b, c; European 
Commission a; MEMO/12/158. 
 
 
Appendix 4: Applying the results to the variables 
 Neo-realism Social Constructivism/ 
Normative theory 
Stated motivation Strategic (normative, in second 
order) 
Normative  
Understanding of norms Passive Period: Focus on 
norms changes in accordance 
with strategic interests 
Active period: Constant focus 
on norms/ changes in 
accordance with the 
developments 
Policies & Actions Passive Period: Change in 
accordance with strategic 
interests 
Active period: Proper 
policies/reactions against the 
developments (i.e. human rights 
violations) in accordance with 
norms–  change for the 
promotion of norms 
Perception of threat Russia: Threat to 
security/stability & 
trade/economy, changes with 
variation in the 
capabilities/intentions of third 
country 
Ukraine, Belarus: Threat to 
normative values, changes with 
variation in the identity of third 
country 
 
 
